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Guided by the policies that sparked the strict products liability
revolution of the past quarter century, courts today are fashioning a doc-
trine of hazardous activity strict liability with far-reaching implications.
Although many observers have equated this doctrine with the Restate-
ment of Torts and have viewed it as moribund, Professors Nolan and
Ursin argue that courts are covertly and overtly rejecting the Restate-
ment approach and that this strict liability doctrine is alive and well,
with a variety of potential applications for attorneys and courts to con-
sider. The authors trace these developments, discuss the contours of this
doctrine, and suggest especially promising new applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past quarter century courts have embraced strict tort liability in
an unprecedented fashion. Premised on articulated concerns of fairness, safety,
the compensation of accident victims, and the spreading of accident costs, strict
products liability has swept the nation.1 Since the California Supreme Court's
pioneering pronouncement of strict tort liability for defective products in its
1963 decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,2 courts, commenta-
tors, and attorneys have considered whether strict products liability represents a
precursor to a wider enterprise liability, and, if so, what form that wider enter-
prise liability might take.3 Proposals have been made for various new strict lia-
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1. See generally PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 93-104A (W. Keeton 5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (extensive discussion of products liability law); see also
Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229, 299-304 (1981) (nationwide
acceptance of strict products liability).
2. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). In the landmark case of Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), the New Jersey Supreme Court ex-
tended warranty recovery to plaintiffs not in privity with the defendant. Greenman made clear that
strict products liability is essentially a tort cause of action. Greenman, 59 Cal.2d at 62, 377 P.2d at
900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
3. See R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 88-89
(4th ed. 1984); Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV.
963, 975-76 (1981); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REV. 363, 375-76 (1965); Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises-One Step
Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REv. 820 (1975); see also Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963) (Burke, J.,
dissenting) (discussing implications of rationale for strict products liability); Wights v. Staff Jen-
nings, Inc., 241 Or. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965) (discussing implications of loss spreading policy).
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bility doctrines, including, among others, strict liability for certain medical
accidents, 4 for injuries on defective business premises,5 and for injuries caused
by dangerously defective leased premises. 6 In the midst of these proposals for
new areas of strict liability, relatively little attention has focused on an existing
doctrine of strict liability-hazardous activity strict liability. This oversight is
unfortunate because this doctrine in recent years has been revitalized by the
infusion of tort policies first articulated in the products liability cases.
Since its origin in the nineteenth-century case of Rylands v. Fletcher,7 the
hazardous activity strict liability doctrine has had a colorful life. American
courts initially reacted with overt hostility to this doctrine because they viewed
the Rylands decision's expansive theory of liability as "an obstacle in the way of
progress and improvement." 8 The doctrine survived, however, like a weed in an
unwelcoming garden. The doctrine even achieved some legitimacy in the 1930s
when the first Restatement of Torts approved a strict liability rule for "ul-
trahazardous activity."9 Courts, in turn, have employed the Restatement in de-
fining this strict liability cause of action.10
By mid-century some commentators viewed the doctrine of hazardous ac-
tivity strict liability as ripe for expansive application. Citing public sentiment
favoring "protection against ordinary hazards of life"'" and the "growth of lia-
bility insurance as an institutional means of risk-bearing and loss shifting,"12
Professor Charles Gregory in 1951 argued that "it is high time for our courts to
proceed on the basis of this theory openly and to stop compromising it with
analogies which stifle its scope and leave us in doubt concerning the state of the
law and its expression in the form of clearly understaindable legal principles."' 13
A decade after Gregory's article appeared, American courts, embracing a loss
spreading philosophy, began to adopt strict liability rules in an unprecedented
manner. These developments, however, occurred in the area of products liabil-
ity, not hazardous activity liability. Today, many commentators share the per-
ception that the hazardous activity strict liability doctrine lies moribund.' 4
4. See, e.g., Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 414, 426 P.2d 525, 535, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 135
(1967) (Tobriner, J., concurring).
5. See, Ursin, supra note 3.
6. Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Lia-
bility?, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 19; see Ursin, supra note 3, at 837-38 n.82. In Becker v. IRM Corp., 38
Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985), the California Supreme Court adopted a rule
of landlord strict liability. The authors of this Article coauthored an amicus brief in Becker for the
California Trial Lawyers Association. For the authors' views on the Becker decision and landlord
strict liability, see Nolan & Ursin, Strict Tort Liability of Landlords: Becker v. IRM Corp. in Con-
text, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 125 (1986).
7. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868).
8. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 448 (1873).
9. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938).
10. E.g., Gallin v. Poulou, 140 Cal. App. 2d 638, 642, 295 P.2d 958, 960 (1956); Beck v. Bel Air
Properties, 134 Cal. App. 2d 834, 841, 286 P.2d 503, 508 (1955); see 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW § 801 (8th ed. 1974).
11. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 382 (1951).
12. Id. at 384.
13. Id. at 395.
14. Professor Gary Schwartz, for example, wrote in 1978 that "[a]lthough ultrahazardous ac-
tivity liability is interesting theoretically, it is of almost no practical importance." Schwartz, Con-
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The thesis of this Article is that the hazardous activity strict liability doc-
trine is alive and well. Announcement of its death is premature; to the contrary,
a reinvigorated doctrine has appeared in leading decisions of recent years. This
doctrine, which draws on contemporary perceptions of tort policy most clearly
articulated in the products liability cases, awaits creative use by attorneys and
courts.
The Article first sketches briefly the troubled history of the hazardous activ-
ity strict liability doctrine in America.': It argues that one reason why this
doctrine has developed more slowly than some expected can be found in the first
Restatement of Torts, promulgated in 1938. Although the Restatement recog-
nized this strict liability doctrine, a less obvious fact about the Restatement is
that it effectively stifled the doctrine's development. The Restatement ensured
that the doctrine would have little significant application by excluding from its
scope activities that are a matter of "common useage."' 16 This posture com-
ported well with attitudes shared by legal scholars who, during the 1930s,
viewed tort law as synonymous with negligence. During this period loss spread-
ing concepts not only were seen at substantively wrong, but were ridiculed as
inappropriate for judicial consideration. The subtle tactic chosen by the Re-
statement to limit strict liability proved successful for decades. Courts that fo-
cused on the Restatement's forthright promulgation of a strict liability rule were
less cognizant of the built-in limitations they accepted when they "adopted" the
Restatement.
During the past two decades, however, courts in products liability cases
have grown accustomed to strict liability rules and the contemporary tort poli-
cies that they reflect. Loss spreading considerations, for example, have emerged
from a status of questionable respectability, becoming a dominant stimulus for
the adoption of strict liability rules. As this Article explains, courts in recent
years also have employed these policy perspectives in hazardous activity cases. 17
Courts increasingly recognize that the restrictions on strict liability of the Re-
statement, and of the more recently promulgated Restatement (Second), I8 con-
flict with contemporary concerns of fairness and safety, as well as with the loss
spreading policy. In response, courts are covertly and overtly rejecting the Re-
tributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 700 n. 17 (1978). Schwartz
reiterated this position in 1981, concluding that "the ultrahazardous rule has stagnated in the courts
...." Schwartz, supra note 3, at 976. "[A]s a matter of the realities of litigation, ultrahazardous
cases seem few and far between. In recent years, very few activities have been newly designated by
the judiciary as ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous; if anything, courts tend to reject ul-
trahazardous arguments in a rather perfunctory way." Id. at 970-71.
The extent of uncertainty over the hazardous activity strict liability doctrine is indicated by the
fact the Prosser and Keeton hornbook presents both Prosser's 1971 interpretation of the case law,
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 78, at 548-54, and the "Reviser's Comments," id. at 554-56, in
which the authors, contrary to Prosser, id. at 551, endorse the first Restatement as "the best way of
articulating and describing the requirements that ought to be met for applying strict liability to
dangerous activities." Id. at 555.
15. See infra notes 22-129 and accompanying text.
16. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520(b) (1938).
17. See infra notes 240-296 and accompanying text.
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977).
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statement approach.19 In so doing they are creating a revitalized doctrine of
hazardous activity strict liability independent of the Restatement. This Article
discusses the contours of that doctrine20 and suggests several promising new
applications.
21
II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS: FROM RYLANDS V FLETCHER THROUGH THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
A. Rylands v. Fletcher and Its Initial Reception in America
The modem doctrine of strict liability for hazardous activities derives from
Rylands v. Fletcher,22 a nineteenth-century English case. To understand the
contemporary law of hazardous activity strict liability properly, it is essential to
understand Rylands and the early American reaction to its holding. Rylands
proclaimed a potentially far reaching doctrine of strict liability to which Ameri-
can courts initially reacted negatively. The modem doctrine of strict liability for
hazardous activities developed when American courts covertly-and later
overtly-embraced a Rylands-like strict liability theory that they initially had
rejected.
In Rylands independent contractors had constructed a reservoir on defend-
ant mill owner's land. Unknown to defendant, ancient coal mining shafts ex-
isted beneath the reservoir. When the reservoir was filled, the water burst into
the shafts, flowed through them, and eventually flooded the nearby coal mines of
plaintiff.23 In Fletcher v. Rylands24 the Court of Exchequer held that plaintiff
could not recover. Trespass and nuisance claims were inapplicable, and defend-
ant was free from blame.25 On appeal to the Exchequer Chamber, however,
judgment was entered for plaintiff under a strict liability theory that carried po-
tentially far reaching implications. Justice Blackburn wrote that
the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings
on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief
if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is
primfi facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural conse-
quence of its escape.
26
The opinion also stated an alternative rule, that one
who has brought something on his own property which was not natu-
rally there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own prop-
erty, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbor's,
should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does
19. See infra notes 130-239 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 297-381 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 382-437 and accompanying text.
22. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868).
23. Id. at 332.
24. 13 L.T.R. 121 (Ex. 1865), rev'd, 3 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330
(1868).
25. Rylands, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. at 339.
26. Rylands, 3 L.R.-Ex. at 279.
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not succeed in confining it to his own property.
27
The House of Lords, hearing the case as Rylands v. Fletcher,28 affirmed the
judgment of the Exchequer Chamber, thus endorsing this new strict liability
theory. Lord Cairns quoted approvingly the above language of Justice Black-
burn and added an alternative gloss of his own, referring to defendant's use of
his land as "a non-natural use, for the purpose of introducing into the close that
which in its natural condition was not in or upon it."'29 Lord Cranworth, in
turn, also concurred in Justice Blackburn's opinion but added his own state-
ment: "If a person brings, or accumulates, on his land anything which, if it
should escape, may cause damage to his neighbor, he does so at his peril."
30
It is possible to grasp the potential implications of the Rylands doctrine for
nineteenth-century American tort law by considering its application to the rail-
road industry. Industrialization was a dominant theme in nineteenth-century
America. Although the railroad made economic integration of the nation and
its industrial explosion possible,3 1 it also exacted an enormous toll: "[T]rains
were also wild beasts; they roared through the countryside, killing livestock,
setting fire to crops, smashing passengers and freight." 32 It takes no great leap
of imagination to apply a Rylands-like principle to sparks that "escape" from a
passing railroad and set fire to fields adjacent to the railroad tracks.33 Moreover,
after accepting such a strict liability rule, American courts might then have ap-
plied that rule to injured bystanders, to passengers injured in derailments, and to
persons injured in railroad crossing accidents.
Of course, these implications of the Rylands principle did not materialize in
nineteenth-century American tort law. Instead, Rylands and its strict liability
theory received a hostile reception in American courts, as reflected in two well-
known cases decided in 1873. In Brown v. Collins34 Chief Justice Charles Doe
of New Hampshire rejected the Rylands doctrine in no uncertain terms. He
warned that the adoption of Rylands would "impose a penalty upon efforts,
made in a reasonable, skillful, and careful manner, to rise above a condition of
barbarism." 3 5 No friend of barbarism, Doe concluded that it "is impossible that
legal principle can throw so serious an obstacle in the way of progress and
improvement."
'36
Similarly, in Losee v. Buchanan 37 New York's highest court stated that the
27. Id. at 280.
28. Rylands, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. at 339.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 340.
31. See T. COCHRAN & W. MILLER, THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 56-57 (1961); J.W. HURST,
LAW AND CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 82-83
(1956); Schlesinger, Ideas and Economic Development, in PATHS OF AMERICAN THOUGHT 11 (A.
Schlesinger, Jr. & M. White ed. 1963); see also D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS 40 (1965) (discussing
problems the railroads presented to nineteenth-century American common law).
32. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 410 (1973).
33. See Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1422, 1450 (1966).
34. 53 N.H. 442 (1873).
35. Id. at 448.
36. Id.
37. 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
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general rule "that I must so use my real estate as not to injure my neighbor [is]
much modified by the exigencies of the social state."'38 The court then specified
these "exigencies": "We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals, and rail-
roads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind, and lay at the
basis of all our civilization."'3 9 The court concluded that "[i]f I have any of these
upon my lands, and they are not a nuisance and are not so managed as to be-
come such, I am not responsible for any damage they accidentally and unavoid-
ably do my neighbor."'' In the court's view strict liability was not only
undesirable but also unnecessary. The injured neighbor "receives his compensa-
tion for such damage by the general good, in which he shares, and the right
which he has to place the same things upon his lands."'4 1 Referring to Rylands,
the court concluded that "[i]t is sufficient.., to say that the law, as laid down in
[that case], is in direct conflict with the law as settled in this country."'42 The
Losee court concluded "that the rule is, at least in this country, a universal one,
which, so far as I can discern, has no exceptions or limitations, that no one can
be made liable for injuries to the person or property of another without some
fault or negligence on his part."
'4 3
It is not surprising that American courts reacted with hostility toward Ry-
lands and its strict liability principle. During much of the nineteenth century
industry was in its infancy in America; there were few transportation or commu-
nication networks, and critical shortages of investment capital.44 Courts persist-
ently responded to the perceived need to protect infant industry from
"excessive" liability.45 Of course, by the end of the nineteenth century the social
38. Id. at 484.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 484-85.
41. Id. at 485.
42. Id. at 486-87.
43. Id. at 491.
44. See authorities cited supra note 31.
45. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 410; M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMER-
ICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 85-99 (1977); L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF
JUSTICE SHAW 164 (1957); see also W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 144
(1975) (decline of the colonial legal system and the new freedom of individuals to choose their own
values influenced the acceptance of competition and materialism). Some scholars have placed less
emphasis on the link between industrialization and tort law. See, e.g., E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA 3 (1980). Although goals other than economic growth also shaped the development of
nineteenth-century tort law, the perceived desirability of economic growth was a dominant value of
that era, and the law reflected this value. See J.W. HURST, supra note 31, at 19. For a recent
contribution to the literature, see Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Rein-
terpretation, 15 GA. L. REv. 925 (1981).
After examining the nineteenth-century tort law of New Hampshire and California, Professor
Gary Schwartz recently has questioned the conventional interpretation of nineteenth-century tort
history. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation,
90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981). In the conventional view "no duty" rules limited even the negligence
liability of specific activities. Id. at 1717, 1766. Schwartz argues, however, that "[f]ar from erecting
a duty prerequisite to every tort claim, the Courts easily recognized that everyone owes a duty to
everyone else to abstain from negligent conduct." Id. at 1773.
As the authors of this Article have discussed elsewhere, Nolan & Ursin, supra note 6, at 142
n. 116, Schwartz's arguments are unpersuasive. First, Schwartz concedes that important limitations
on negligence liability existed in the area of governmental tort liability and in employee accident
cases. Schwartz, supra, at 1769-73. With respect to other types of cases, such as suits against chari-
ties and product accident cases, Schwartz unpersuasively claims that nineteenth-century tort law was
[Vol. 65
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and economic conditions that might have justified this judicial posture had
changed. Industry had advanced beyond infancy, and the nation's values and
priorities had changed. Small, struggling enterprises had evolved into large-
scale corporations, 4 6 and these business enterprises now had the capacity to ab-
sorb tort liability and spread liability costs among the public as part of the price
of goods and services. Tort law reform did not, however, come quickly to the
American judiciary.47
Nevertheless, an American doctrine of strict liability for hazardous activi-
ties developed in spite of an initially hostile reaction to Rylands. At first, courts
employed "covert" means to impose strict liability on hazardous activities such
as blasting. They acted covertly both because of uncertainty about the doc-
trine's contours and because of precedents such as Brown and Losee that com-
pletely rejected the doctrine of strict liability. Thus, courts often resorted to
artful, if perhaps disingenuous, uses of outdated and obscure doctrines to recog-
nize implicitly strict liability.
48
free of special no duty and immunity rules. Schwartz writes, for example, that in California "the
only suit against a product seller for an injury caused by a product defect led to victory for the
nonprivity product victim." Id. at 1766. It would be incorrect, however, to infer that nineteenth-
century California case law anticipated Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo's landmark 1916
decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), which overturned
the well-established privity barrier to negligence liability established by Winterbottom v. Wright, 152
Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). Schwartz's footnote citation to the California case reveals that it is not a
MacPherson-type case at all. Schwartz, supra, at 1776 n.365. The case, Lewis v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39,
43 P. 398 (1896), allowed a tenant to recover against a retailer who had willfully misrepresented the
safety of a folding bed to the buyer landlord. Indeed, the Terry court cited with approval the
Winterbottom rule and American cases following it. Id. at 44, 43 P.2d at 399.
46. See R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 229-30 (1955); J.W. HURST, supra note 31, at
71-72; Schlesinger, supra note 31, at 118-19.
47. See Ursin, supra note 1, at 263-87. Indeed, it was not until 1916 that MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), suggested that manufacturers owed a duty of due
care absent privity of contract.
Courts also exhibited hostility toward legislative reform of restrictive nineteenth-century tort
rules. For example, in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911), New York's
highest court held that a recently enacted workers' compensation plan violated both the state and
federal constitutions. Id. at 317, 94 N.E. at 448. The Ives opinion resembles the Losee opinion in its
hostility toward the abrogation of the requirement that injured plaintiffs prove negligence and in its
view of social policy. The Ives court viewed fault or negligence as an immutable principle. Thus, the
workmen's compensation statute, "judged by our common-law standards, is plainly revolutionary."
Id. at 285, 94 N.E. at 436. It followed for the court that this "liability unknown to the common law
... plainly constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property under the Federal and State Constitu-
tions." Id. at 294, 94 N.E. at 439. The court succinctly stated its perspective in the following
passage:
If the legislature can say to an employer, "you must compensate your employee for an
injury not caused by you or by your fault," why can it not go further and say to the man of
wealth, "you have more property than you need and your neighbor is so poor that he can
barely subsist; in the interest of natural justice you must divide with your neighbor so that
he and his dependents shall not become a charge upon the state?"
Id. at 295-96, 94 N.E. at 440. And according to the Ives court, in the "final and simple analysis that
is taking the property of A and giving it to B, and that cannot be done under our Constitutions." Id.
at 296, 94 N.E. at 440.
48. See, e.g., Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159, 161-162 (1849); Ehrenzweig, supra note 33, at
1426-27.
With respect to the New York Court of Appeals, Professor Charles Gregory concluded that the
tactic of New York's highest court was "to maintain a 'bootlegal' conception of absolute liability
without fault where it thought it could cover its tracks by mentioning the ancient and outworn
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
By the 1930s some American courts had made faltering starts toward artic-
ulating a strict liability rule for hazardous activities. For example, courts had
applied strict liability principles to blasting49 and, occasionally, to escaping
water 5°---the latter application suggested, of course, by Rylands. Three deci-
sions suggested particularly far-reaching implications. In 1924 the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Bridgeman-Russell v. City of Duluth5 extended the Rylands
strict liability rule beyond reservoirs to the escape of water from the principal
main leading from a reservoir. The court wrote that "[i]n such a case, even
though negligence is absent, natural justice would seem to demand that the en-
terprise, or what is really the same thing, the whole community benefited by the
enterprise, should stand the loss rather than the individual."'52 This language
suggests a broad theory of enterprise liability-that strict liability properly ap-
plies to business enterprises that benefit from hazardous activities and can
spread losses among the whole community.5 3 Thus, although the Bridgeman-
Russell court limited its holding to the principal main leading from a reservoir,54
its rationale could support further extensions of strict liability, such as the appli-
cation of strict liability to other water mains, 55 to gas pipelines,5 6 and to numer-
ous other hazardous activities of business enterprises.
57
In Green v. General Petroleum Corp.58 the California Supreme Court in
1928 extended strict liability beyond blasting and explosives to the nonnegligent
operations of an oil company when an oil well had "blown out," casting debris
on plaintiff's property. As in several other cases of this period, the court de-
clined to endorse Rylands openly and instead relied in part on misapplied no-
tions of trespass. 59 The Green court, however, fashioned a broad principle of
strict liability:
Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise lawful
and proper in itself, deliberately does an act under known conditions,
and, with knowledge that injury may result to another, proceeds, and
injury is done to the other as the direct and proximate consequence of
the act, however carefully done, the one who does the act and causes
the injury should, in all fairness, be required to compensate the other
for the injury done.
60
The breadth of this statement, coupled with the court's elliptical reference to an
concept of unintended trespass and could thus seem to avoid consorting with the theory of absolute
liability." Gregory, supra note 11, at 378-379.
49. See Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849).
50. See, e.g., Parker v. Larsen, 86 Cal. 236, 24 P. 989 (1890).
51. 158 Minn. 509, 197 N.W. 971 (1924).
52. Id. at 511, 197 N.W. at 972.
53. See generally Ehrenzweig, supra note 33, at 1452-53 (discussing enterprise liability).
54. Bridgeman-Russell, 158 Minn. at 511-12, 197 N.W.2d at 972.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 419-34.
56. See infra note 435.
57. See infra note 435.
58. 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928).
59. See Gregory, supra note 11, at 3 88-89.
60. Green, 205 Cal. at 333-34, 270 P. at 955. The court went on to stress the "actual invasion"
of plaintiff's property. Id. at 334, 270 P. at 955.
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enterprise theory of liability, suggested that the California Supreme Court
might have entertained further applications of strict liability.
Three years later a prestigious panel of the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, consisting of Judges Swan, Learned Hand, and
Augustus N. Hand, rendered another significant decision in this area. In Exner
v. Sherman Power Construction Co.6 1 the court extended strict liability beyond
blasting to the storage of explosives, and beyond damage caused by debris cast
on the land of another to damage caused by concussion. Again, the early stir-
rings of an enterprise liability theory appear in the court's opinion. The court
stated that the extent to which one is liable for injuries to another absent negli-
gence "involves an adjustment of conflicting interests."6 2 Then the court held:
When, as here the defendant, though without fault, has engaged in the
perilous activity of storing large quantities of a dangerous explosive for
use in his business, we think there is no justification for relieving it of
liability, and that the owner of the business, rather than a third person
who has no relation to the explosion, other than that of injury, should
bear the loss.
6 3
Taken together, the Bridgeman-Russell, Green, and Exner decisions might
have set the stage for further extensions of the hazardous activity strict liability
doctrine. In fact, however, the likelihood of an expansive strict liability doctrine
was diminished when the first Restatement of Torts appeared in the 1930s.64 As
discussed in the next section of this Article, the Restatement's treatment of haz-
ardous activity liability effectively stifled the growth of the strict liability
doctrine.
B. The Restatement of Torts: Stagnation of the Hazardous Activity Strict
Liability Doctrine
The American Law Institute's promulgation of the Restatement of Torts in
the 1930s represents the most conspicuous early American development in the
area of hazardous activity strict liability.65 Sections 519 and 520 of the first
Restatement imposed strict liability on one who carried on an "ultrahazardous
activity."' 66 An activity was considered ultrahazardous "if it (a) necessarily in-
volves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of
common usage." 67 The Restatement provided that
one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another
whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to
be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm
resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous
61. 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931).
62. Id. at 514.
63. Id.
64. See RESTATEMENT Op ToRTS §§ 519, 520 (1938).
65. See id.
66. Id. § 519.
67. Id. § 520.
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although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm.68
By embracing a strict liability rule for ultrahazardous activities, the Re-
statement could have encouraged courts to adopt an expansive strict liability
doctrine. As previously noted, American courts that had embraced strict liabil-
ity results often had done so in a covert manner, relying on antiquated and mis-
applied doctrines such as unintended trespass.69 Professor Albert Ehrenzweig
characterized the Restatement, in contrast, as "[c]ourageously abandoning the
language of traditional strict liabilities (where there is still much talk of pre-
sumptions of negligence or violations of duty)."' 70 In 1951 he wrote that "[w]ith
its liability for 'ultrahazardous activities' the American Law Institute has taken a
further and, potentially at least, decisive step towards the recognition of a new
rationale of enterprise liability. ' '7 1 Moreover, by offering a generally stated rule
of strict liability, the first Restatement suggested the expansion of strict liability
beyond the already established categories of strict liability such as blasting and
the escape of artificially collected water.
72
Thus, it is paradoxical that the Restatement of Torts on its own terms actu-
ally precluded any significant expansion of strict liability by its definition of ul-
trahazardous activity. The first part of that definition focused on the
dangerousness of the activity. 73 The Restatement also required, however, that
an activity not be "a matter of common usage."' 74 In other words, strict liability
would not attach to activities that were quite hazardous but a matter of common
usage.
Commenting on the Restatement, Professor Ehrenzweig noted that the
"rule would admirably fit all kinds of mechanical enterprise if it could be applied
to every ultrahazardous activity.' '75 Under such a rule, "a railroad would be
liable for fire caused in a distant cottage by a spark from its engine. For, harm of
this type was 'likely' to result from this 'unpreventable miscarriage' of its activ-
ity. ' '76 This rule would provide the rationale for liability "of mechanical enter-
prise for unpreventable calculable harm."'77 Such a rule, however, was
precluded by the first Restatement's common usage exception. As Ehrenzweig
noted, "railroads . . . are excluded as 'of common usage' and, therefore, are
within the generally recognized domain of the negligence rule."'78
68. Id. § 519.
69. Gregory, supra note 11, at 378.
70. Ehrenzweig, supra note 33, at 1452.
71. Ehrenzweig, supra note 33, at 1452.
72. See Comment, Absolute Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities. An Appraisal of the Restate-
ment Doctrine, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 269, 277-83 (1949) (discussing California cases in light of the
Restatement).
73. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520(a) (1938). For the relevant language, see supra text ac-
companying note 67.
74. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520(b) (1938).
75. Ehrenzweig, supra note 33, at 1452 (emphasis added).
76. Ehrenzweig, supra note 33, at 1452.
77. Enrenzweig, supra note 33, at 1453.
78. Ehrenzweig, supra note 33, at 1453. Although the first Restatement's authors undoubtedly
intended to exclude from strict liability such "common" activities as the railroad, the Restatement
itself contains some confusion on this point: an "activity is a matter of common usage if it is custom-
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By its exclusion of strict liability for activities that were a matter of com-
mon usage, the Restatement in effect assured that the strict liability rule which it
"recognized" would have little practical application. The Restatement's authors
viewed its strict liability rule as applicable to blasting; to the manufacture, stor-
age, transportation, and use of explosives; to the drilling of oil wells that results
in gushers; and to aviation.7 9 Because the case law supported these applications
of strict liability, the authors had little choice. However, the Restatement's
common usage exclusion would seem to cast doubt on even these applications of
strict liability.80 In any event, the ultimate effect of the Restatement's common
usage criterion was to discourage the application of strict liability to new areas,
such as the railroad accidents of which Ehrenzweig wrote. Similarly, use of the
automobile, a prominent hazardous activity of this century, is not "ul-
trahazardous" because it has "come into such general use that [its] operation is a
matter of common usage."
8 1
The Restatement's restrictive posture is easily explained. Nineteenth-cen-
tury judges were not the only Americans hostile to strict liability. Throughout
the first half of the twentieth century an impressive body of legal scholarship
stood in opposition to judicial acceptance of rules of strict liability, and of course
legal scholars played a key role in formulating the Restatement. Most scholars
tended to view tort law as synonomous with the negligence principle, which they
accepted as a given and from which they could deduce subsidiary rules.
8 2
Although Rylands may have required commentators to discuss strict liability,
this discussion usually treated strict liability as an anomaly to be puzzled over,
criticized, rationalized, and limited.
8 3
Professor Thayer, in an article appearing in 1916, stated that "after making
all allowance for precedent and practical confusion alike, such a result as Ry-
arily carried on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community." RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 520 comment e (1938). This definition could have led to new applications of
strict liability more expansive than those envisioned by the drafters of the first Restatement. For
example, railroading could be seen as an activity not carried on by the great mass of mankind or by
many in the community, even though railroads are common.
In fact, however, courts and commentators have recognized the intent of the drafters of the
Restatement to preclude the application of its strict liability rule to activities that are common. Eg.,
Ramsey v. Marutamaya Ogatsu Fireworks Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 516, 140 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1977);
Beck v. Bell Air Properties, 134 Cal. App. 2d 834, 286 P.2d 503 (1955); C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN
& R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 502-03 (3d ed. 1977); see also infra note 80.
79. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 comments b & e (1938).
80. For example, drilling for oil, especially in communities where oil is likely to be found, could
be seen as a matter of common usage. Indeed, the first Restatement comments provide that an
activity is a matter of common usage if it is customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind or
by many people in the community. Id. comment e. Drilling for oil, where oil is likely to be found,
could well be an activity carried on "by many people in the community." See supra note 78; infra
notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
81. RESTATEMENT OF1 TORTS § 520 comment e (1938).
82. See, e.g., Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372, 375, 39
COLUM. L. REV. 20, 23, 48 YALE L.J. 390, 393 (1939) [hereinafter Seavey, Cardozo; citation to
HARV. L. REV. only]; Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72 (1942) [hereinafter Seavey,
Principles].
83. See, e.g., Seavey, Cardozo, supra note 82, at 375; Seavey, Principles, supra note 82, at 85-87.
A notable exception, of course, was Dean Leon Green. See, eg., Green, The Duty Problem in Negli-
gence Cases II, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 255, 282 (1929).
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lands v. Fletcher produces in our system is not tolerable, and those courts have
done well who have flatly refused to have anything to do with it."' 84 Then, stat-
ing that although he did not necessarily agree with the notorious holding of New
York's highest court that workers' compensation statutes were unconstitu-
tional, 85 Thayer concurred with that court "as to the fundamental proposition of
the common law which links liability to fault." 86 In 1920 Professor Jeremiah
Smith analyzed the New York blasting cases.87 Smith's aversion to the theory
of strict liability led him to propose a means whereby tort law could avoid the
unseemly intrusion of strict liability. He simply, and naively,88 classified all
blasting conducted within a given distance from the interests of others as, by
definition, negligent, no matter how carefully done.
89
In 1942, after the promulgation of the first Restatement's provision regard-
ing ultrahazardous activity, Professor Warren Seavey, noted with satisfaction
that "[w]ith minor exceptions, a person who does not intentionally interfere with
the interests of another and who acts carefully and lawfully is not liable for the
unexpected harmful consequences of his act." 90 Among these "minor excep-
tions," Seavey included, as the only one of any importance, the doctrine of strict
liability for ultrahazardous activity, which he saw as applicable only to blasting,
the keeping of explosives, and the operation of airplanes.91 According to Sea-
vey, the ultrahazardous strict liability rule thus properly constituted a minor
exception to the dominant negligence principle. Moreover, Seavey's view of tort
law would not countenance the suggestion that strict liability expand in response
to the ability of business enterprises to distribute accident costs through insur-
ance and increased prices. Indeed, Seavey denigrated the loss spreading policy
as a basis for tort reform. He praised judges who "did not become the protector
of the injured merely because the defendant had ample funds to meet a judgment
or had an ability to spread the loss. ' '92 Seavey viewed the loss spreading policy
as not only substantively undesirable, but even inappropriate for judicial consid-
eration-as "sentimental justice" as opposed to "legal justice."'93
Viewed from the perspective of the 1980s, the antipathy of the first Restate-
ment and of scholars such as Seavey toward strict liability and loss spreading
concepts appears antiquated. During the past quarter century courts have
brought about sweeping reforms of tort law, including the adoption of strict
liability rules in products cases. Insurance and loss spreading concepts have
84. Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 HARV. L. REV. 801, 814 (1916).
85. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911). For a discussion of Ives,
see supra note 47.
86. Thayer, supra note 84, at 814-15.
87. Smith, Liability for Substantial Physical Damage to Land by Blasting-The Role of the
Future, 33 HARv. L. REV. 542 (1920); see Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849).
88. See Gregory, supra note 11, at 380.
89. Smith, supra note 87, at 548.
90. See Seavey, Principles, supra note 82, at 85.
91. Seavey, Principles, supra note 82, at 86.
92. Seavey, Cardozo, supra note 82, at 373.
93. Seavey, Cardozo, supra note 82, at 373.
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emerged from a shadow of questionable respectability94 to become the dominant
stimuli for tort law reform,95 both in the adoption and elaboration of strict prod-
ucts liability rules9 6 and in the judicial assault on traditional doctrines that im-
munized even negligent defendants from tort liability.
9 7
Because of the first Restatement's restrictive approach, however, the tort
revolution until recently9 8 has left the hazardous activity strict liability doctrine
almost untouched. Courts relied on the Restatement in deciding cases, and they
viewed its provisions as stating the elements of the strict liability cause of ac-
tion.99 Although the Restatement's open adoption of a strict liability rule ap-
peared progressive at the time, the more subtle effect, discussed previously, 1° °
was to exclude activities regarded as "common usage" and thus to assure that
hazardous activity strict liability would have little practical application. When
courts looked to the Restatement for guidance, they received a message that
required a restrictive application of strict liability rules.101
In the decades following the adoption of the first Restatement, however, the
case law continued to develop. Courts applied strict liability principles to new
94. See Ursin, supra note 1, at 295-304. Professors Gregory and Kalven have stated that only
in the late 1950s and early 1960s did loss distribution and insurance emerge as "respectable" topics
in tort law. C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 694 (2d ed. 1969).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 246-50.
96. See, eg., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963) (defective design theory); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960) (warranty theory); see also Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 213 (1985) (strict landlord tort liability). For a discussion of the role of the loss spreading
policy in contemporary tort law, see infra notes 246-69 and accompanying text.
Prior to Henningsen and Greenman commentators frequently assumed that strict liability,
which for years had applied to food products, would not apply in other products cases. See, eg.,
Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REv. 401, 442-43 (1959). This assump-
tion enabled commentators to avoid discussing the merits of strict products liability. Id. It also
precluded them from sensing the monumental changes that soon would occur in products liability.
Id. In a 1957 symposium discussing whether strict liability should extend beyond food products,
only Professor Fleming James argued for such an extension. See James, General Products-Should
Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. Rav. 923, 926 (1957). For contrary
views, see Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24
TENN. L. REv. 928, 984 (1957); Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liabil-
ity, 24 TENN. L. REv. 963, 1017-18 (1957); Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers For Injuries
Caused By Defects in Products--An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. Rav. 938, 940 (1957). In 1960
Dean Prosser approved of the extension of strict liability beyond food products. See Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1124 (1960). He
wrote, however, that extension beyond products for bodily use "is likely to proceed ... slowly ....
After many.., accretions, we may arrive at a 'general rule' of strict liability for all products, with
certain specified exceptions; but these things are still of uncertain and indefinite future." Id. at 1139-
40.
97. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975)
(contributory negligence no longer bars plaintiff's recovery); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (landowner must act as a reasonable person; traditional land-
owner immunity rules abrogated); Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (governmental immunity abolished).
98. See infra notes 130-239 and accompanying text.
99. E.g., Gallin v. Poulou, 140 Cal. App. 2d 638, 295 P.2d 958 (1956); Beck v. Bel Air Proper-
ties, 134 Cal. App. 2d 834, 286 P.2d 503 (1955); see 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 10, § 801.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 65-81.
101. See, eg., Ramsey v. Marutamaya Ogatsu Fireworks Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 516, 527 n.2, 140
Cal. Rptr. 247, 253 n.2 (1977) (concluding, under RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938), that "a
fireworks display is not an ultrahazardous activity").
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activities, such as fumigation, 10 2 crop dusting, 10 3 and, more recently, the haul-
ing of gasoline by tanker trucks.'14 None of these decisions appeared to make a
sharp break from either previous case law or the Restatement. However, when
examined more carefully-and in the context of contemporary judicial attitudes
toward tort policy-these decisions point to a revitalized strict liability doctrine,
one sharply at odds with the Restatement's restrictiveness. Before turning to a
detailed examination of these decisions, this Article first examines the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts and compares it to the first Restatement of Torts.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts appeared in draft form in the 1960s
lO5
and was formally adopted in 1977.106 In their reassessment of the first Restate-
ment's treatment of the ultrahazardous activity doctrine, the drafters of Restate-
ment (Second) had the opportunity to build on the new applications of strict
liability that had emerged since the first Restatement-such as the California
Supreme Court's 1948 decision in Luthringer v. Moore,10 7 in which the court
applied strict liability to fumigation. The drafters also had an opportunity to
assess the implications for the hazardous activity doctrine of tort policies, in-
cluding the loss spreading policy, underlying the tort revolution of the 1960s and
1970s. Instead, the Restatement (Second), under the guidance of Dean William
Prosser, not only retained restrictive features of the first Restatement but also
added more restrictive features of its own and implied that the loss spreading
policy is irrelevant in hazardous activity cases.108
The language of the Restatement (Second) differs considerably from that of
the first Restatement. Referring to its strict liability rule as applying to "abnor-
mally dangerous activity," section 519 provides that "[o]ne who carries on an
abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land
or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the
utmost care to prevent the harm."' 1 9 Section 520 then lists six factors to be
considered in determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
102. Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 498-500, 190 P.2d 1, 6-8 (1948).
103. See Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961); Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88
Wash. 2d 855, 567 P.2d 218 (1977).
104. Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972), cert denied, 411 U.S. 983
(1973).
105. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977).
107. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
108. Some observers have viewed the Restatement (Second) as adopting a posture toward strict
liability more expansive than the first Restatement. See, eg., Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220,
257 A.2d 138 (1969). As this Article will explain, this view is mistaken. Nevertheless, courts wish-
ing to expand the ambit of strict liability have appropriately emphasized "expansive" language con-
tained in the Restatement (Second). As discussed infra notes 130-381 and accompanying text,
courts in fact are rejecting the frameworks of the Restatement and the Restatement (Second), and
are instead developing a more expansive framework of their own.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
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(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried
on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes." 0
The first three of these factors refer to the hazardousness of the activity.
With respect to these "hazardousness" criteria, the changes made from the first
Restatement appear largely cosmetic. For example, the Restatement (Second)
abandons the term "ultrahazardous" and instead refers to "abnormally danger-
ous activity." The comments to the Restatement (Second) explain that the term
"ultrahazardous" was the "wrong word" and "misleading" and that it had been
adopted in the first Restatement for "no visible reason." '' The first Restate-
ment had spoken of the "miscarriage"'1 12 of the abnormally dangerous activity;
however, the Restatement (Second) observes: "It is not necessary that anything
should go wrong with the activity. The liability is all the clearer when the harm
is brought about by its normal and ordinary operation."' 113 Finally, the first
Restatement required, for the imposition of strict liability, "a risk of serious
harm ... which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of utmost care."114 The
Restatement (Second) observes that this statement "is misleading. There is
probably no activity whatever, unless it be the use of atomic energy, which is not
perfectly safe if the utmost care is used." 115 Therefore, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) requires an "inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable
care." 1
16
Significantly, the Restatement (Second) retains the common usage factor
which curtailed the expansion of strict liability under the first Restatement. Un-
like the first Restatement, however, the Restatement (Second) does not state this
element as an absolute requirement. Rather, common usage-as well as the
other five factors-is simply "to be considered [in] determining whether an ac-
tivity is abnormally dangerous."' 1 7 The comments to the Restatement (Sec-
ond), however, make clear that common usage is sufficient to place an activity
outside the strict liability doctrine: "The usual dangers resulting from an activ-
ity that is one of common usage are not regarded as abnormal, even though a
serious risk of harm cannot be eliminated by all reasonable care."' 18 This con-
clusion also finds support in the examples of activities in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) that are subject to strict liability and those that are not. The examples of
activities subject to strict liability include blasting; the manufacture, storage,
transportation, and use of explosives; and oil well drilling.'1 9 Examples of activ-
110. Id. § 520.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 notes 1-2 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
112. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 note 2 (rent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
114. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 note 2 (rent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(c) (1977).
117. Id. § 520.
118. Id. § 520 comment i.
119. Id.
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ities that are not subject to strict liability include the operation of automobiles
and railway engines. 120 Thus, the Restatement (Second) reiterates the insistence
of the first Restatement that strict liability does not attach to activities that are a
matter of common usage.
In addition, the Restatement (Second) creates new obstacles for courts that
might otherwise want to recognize innovative applications of hazardous activity
strict liability. Dean Prosser, the reporter for the Restatement (Second), had
criticized the first Restatement because its ultrahazardous rule extended beyond
Rylands in ignoring the relation of the activity to its surroundings.1 2 1 Under
Prosser's guidance, the Restatement (Second) added, as one of the six factors
that courts should consider, the appropriateness of the place where the activity
is carried on. The comments to the Restatement (Second) state
the fact that the activity is inappropriate to the place where it is carried
on is a factor of importance in determining whether the danger is an
abnormal one. This is sometimes expressed, particularly in the English
cases, by saying there is strict liability for a "non-natural" use of the
defendant's land. 122
As with the common usage factor, the appropriateness to the place factor
may suffice to defeat strict liability. As an illustration, the Restatement (Second)
states that blasting, which otherwise would subject a party to strict liability, "is
not abnormally dangerous if it is done on an uninhabited mountainside.1
123
And it further notes that
[t]here are some highly dangerous activities, that necessarily involve a
risk of serious harm in spite of all possible care, that can be carried on
only in a particular place.... [If] these activities are of sufficient value
to the community.... they may not be regarded as abnormally dan-
gerous when they are so located, since the only place where the activity
can be carried on must necessarily be regarded as an appropriate
one. 124
The Restatement (Second) introduces a second new factor that reveals
much regarding its approach to strict liability. This factor directs inquiry into
the "extent to which [the activity's] value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes." 12 5 Although comments to the Restatement (Second)
elsewhere observe that its strict liability rule "is applicable to an activity that is
carried on with all reasonable care, and that is of such utility that the risk which
is involved in it cannot be regarded as so great or so unreasonable as to make it
negligence merely to carry on the activity at all," 126 the value to the community
factor saps this statement of its meaning and converts the strict liability rule of
120. Id.
121. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 78, at 512 (4th ed. 1971).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment j (1977).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. § 520(f).
126. Id. § 520 comment b.
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the Restatement (Second) into a theory similar to negligence. 127 The Restate-
ment (Second) comment on this factor makes clear that an activity's value suf-
fices to preclude strict liability even though the activity is hazardous and
complies with the requirement that it not occur as a matter of common usage:
"Even though the activity involves a serious risk of harm that cannot be elimi-
nated with reasonable care and it is not a matter of common usage, its value to
the community may be such that the danger will not be regarded as an abnormal
one."' 128 Thus, an activity that might have been subject to strict liability under
the first Restatement is not subject to such liability under the Restatement (Sec-
ond) if it is of sufficient value to the community.
Because it excluded activities that are a matter of common usage, the first
Restatement had effectively precluded the extensive application of strict liability
rules to the hazardous activities of commercial enterprises. With its added fac-
tors, the Restatement (Second) implies that even though an activity involves
high risk of harm, a likelihood of great resulting harm, and inability to eliminate
the risk by exercising reasonable care, strict liability may be precluded (1) if the
activity is a matter of common usage, or (2) if it is appropriate to the place where
it occurs, or (3) if it is of great value to the community. Rather than attempting
to identify activities that warrant strict liability treatment and develop rules to
guide future law development, the Restatement (Second) sought to freeze an
already frozen body of law, and even sought to convert the vocabulary of this
area of law to that of negligence. 129 In so doing, the drafters of the Restatement
(Second) chose to ignore the policies underlying the tort revolution of the past
quarter century, and they made no attempt to apply those policies to the area of
liability for hazardous activities.
III. TOWARD A CONTEMPORARY DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY FOR
HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES
In response to the Restatement's restrictive doctrinal framework, courts in
recent years have developed an impressive body of case law that pays little heed
to this framework. Moreover, courts have begun to reject both the Restatement
framework and its specific provisions. In place of that restrictive framework,
courts are creating an expansive new body of hazardous activity doctrine pre-
mised on contemporary tort policies. Part A of this section of the Article ana-
lyzes the case law that rejects the Restatement. Part B discusses the perceptions
127. See Yukon Equip. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska 1978);
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 970. The authors of the Prosser and Keeton hornbook argue that the
value to the community factor "is irrelevant [to the question] whether or not a risk should be allo-
cated to the defendant because of the dangerousness, as such, of the activity." PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, § 78, at 555.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment k (1977).
129. The authors of the Prosser and Keeton hornbook conclude:
when a court applies all of the factors suggested in the Second Restatement it is doing
virtually the same thing as is done with the negligence concept, except for the fact that it is
the function of the court to apply the abnormally dangerous concept to the facts as found
by the jury.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 78, at 555; see supra note 127.
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of contemporary tort policy on which this case law rests. Part C discusses the
criteria that are emerging to define this newly-invigorated hazardous activity
doctrine and discusses possible new applications of the doctrine.
A. The Case Law Rejecting the Restatement and the Restatement (Second)
Like their nineteenth-century counterparts,1 30 contemporary courts in haz-
ardous activity cases at times disguise what they are doing. Although purport-
ing to follow the Restatement, these decisions have "interpreted" it to achieve
results inconsistent with and more expansive than those envisioned by the Re-
statement. Moreover, in several recent cases courts have explicitly declared
their dissatisfaction with the Restatement and rejected its framework. The
methodology employed in these decisions is as important as their precise hold-
ings. Increasingly, courts have relied on the loss spreading policy, which has
animated the products liability revolution of the past quarter century, to impose
strict liability in hazardous activity cases.
Two decisions of the Washington Supreme Court illustrate this trend. In
its 1973 decision in Siegler v. Kuhlman 13 1 the court applied strict liability to a
gasoline explosion caused when defendant trucker's gasoline trailer overturned.
The Siegler court, after reciting the six Restatement (Second) factors,132 stated
that "one cannot escape the conclusion that hauling gasoline as cargo is undeni-
ably an abnormally dangerous activity and on its face possesses all of the factors
necessary for imposition of strict liability as set forth in the Restatement (Sec-
ond)." 133 The court then described defendant's acti-ity as "involving a high
degree of risk; it is a risk of great harm and injury; it creates dangers that cannot
be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care."134 That description arguably
established that the hazardousness criteria-the first three Restatement (Sec-
ond) factors-were met.135 But what of the last three Restatement (Second)
factors? A defendant in this situation could argue that its activity was a matter
of common usage 136 (carried on by many people in the community), that it was
appropriate to the place137 (trucking was appropriate on highways), and that it
was of value to the community138 (which obviously depended on the delivery of
gasoline). The Siegler court's statement that all Restatement factors are met
thus would seem to call for some explanation by the court. Only one relevant
sentence appears in the opinion: "That gasoline cannot be practicably trans-
ported except upon the public highways does not decrease the abnormally high
130. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
131. 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973).
132. See supra text accompanying note 110 (listing six factors).
133. Siegler, 81 Wash. 2d at 459, 502 P.2d at 1187 (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(a)-(c) (1977); see supra text accompanying note
110.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(d) (1977).
137. Id. § 520(e).
138. Id. § 520(f).
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risk arising from its transportation." 139 This sentence, however, does not sug-
gest that the last three Restatement factors are met, but instead that the hazard-
ousness of the activity calls for strict liability even if they are not met. By
virtually ignoring the last three Restatement (Second) factors, the Siegler court
implied that they are of little or no significance in determining whether a partic-
ular hazardous activity should be subject to strict liability. Finally, Siegler also
marks the explicit introduction of the loss spreading policy into Washington's
hazardous activity case law. 140 In a concurring opinion, joined by three other
justices, Justice Rosellini stated that "a good reason to apply [strict liability],
which is not mentioned in the majority opinion, is that the commercial trans-
porter can spread the loss among his customers-who benefit from the ex-
trahazardous use of the highways." 14 1 Thus, the loss spreading policy, which
has played a prominent role in strict products liability developments, 14 2 was also
seen as important to hazardous activity cases.
A subsequent decision of the Washington Supreme Court similarly stands
at odds with the Restatement (Second). In its 1977 decision in Langan v.
Valicopters, Inc. 143 the court applied strict liability to the activity of crop dust-
ing when defendant's pesticide had settled on a neighbor's organic farm. The
court stated that it had previously "adopted the Restatement (Second) .... [that
it had] considered each of the factors listed in the Restatement..., [and that] in
this case, each test of the Restatement is met."'144 This is a remarkable conclu-
sion. The court, in its opinion, "[recognized] the prevalence of crop dusting and
[acknowledged that] it is ordinarily done in large portions of the Yakima Valley
[and that] 287 aircraft were used in 1975." 14 5 These acknowledged facts cast
doubt on the applicability of the last three Restatement (Second) factors. 146 A
139. Siegler, 81 Wash. 2d at 459, 502 P.2d at 1187.
140. See infra text accompanying note 157 (discussing a later case relying on this concurring
opinion).
141. Siegler, 81 Wash. 2d at 460, 502 P.2d at 1188 (Rosellini, J., concurring). In his Siegler
concurrence Justice Rosellini suggested that strict liability should not apply when an explosive sub-
stance escapes due to the intervention of an "outside force beyond the control of the manufacturer,
the owner, or the operator of the vehicle hauling it"-for example, due to a collision with another
vehicle that is negligently driven. Id. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977)
(rejecting such a limitation on strict liability). In New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Water
Power Co., 102 Wash. 2d 495, 504, 687 P.2d 212, 217 (1984) (Rosellini, J., dissenting), Justice
Rosellini urged the court to apply strict liability to the escape of natural gas from pipelines. In that
case the leak in the gas line might have been caused by a company that years earlier had laid under-
ground telephone cable. Id. at 497, 687 P.2d at 214. Justice Rosellini urged the application of strict
liability because of the "risks that may occur [due to] negligent excavators .... analogizing those
risks to the risks in the "transport of natural gas [due to] negligent drivers." Id. at 505, 687 P.2d at
218 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). For a description of the applicability of strict liability to the escape of
natural gas, see infra note 435.
142. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
143. 88 Wash. 2d 855, 567 P.2d 218 (1977).
144. Id. at 860-61, 567 P.2d at 221-22 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 864, 567 P.2d at 223.
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(d)-(f) (1977); see Bennett v. Larson Co., 118
Wis. 2d 681, 348 N.W.2d 540 (1984) (rejecting strict liability for pesticide spraying); see also Koos v.
Roth, 293 Or. 670, 682, 652 P.2d 1255, 1263 (1982) ("If there is an appropriate location for aerial
crop dusting it is over open agricultural fields."); 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAV OF
TORTS § 14.16, at 338 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that "[a]s the sprays have become better known, their
application has become more and more a matter of 'common usage' ").
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careful analysis of the Langan court's treatment of these factors demonstrates
that Langan, like the earlier Siegler case, stands for the proposition that the
Restatement (Second) is not the proper focus for strict liability analysis.
Regarding the requirement that an activity not occur as a matter of com-
mon usage, the Langan court first quoted the Restatement (Second) definition:
"An activity is a matter of common usage if it is customarily carried on by the
great mass of mankind, or by many people in the community." 14 7 The court
then recited the above quoted facts and simply characterized the presence of 287
aircraft as indicative that crop dusting was "carried on by only a comparatively
small number of persons." 148 It thus concluded that crop dusting was "not a
matter of common usage." 149 The court offered no more than this terse expla-
nation, and it did not attempt to explain why the operation of so many aircraft
did not constitute common usage. When read in conjunction with the Siegler
trucking case,150 Langan suggests that common usage, at least as that term nor-
mally would be defined, does not defeat strict liability.
Similarly, the Langan court's treatment of the appropriateness to the place
criterion suggests that this factor also has no place in contemporary strict liabil-
ity analysis. Although conceding that crop dusting was prevalent and done in
large portions of the Yakima Valley,151 the court's entire statement on the ap-
propriateness to the place factor appears in one sentence: "Given the nature of
organic farming, the use of pesticides adjacent to such an area must be consid-
ered an activity conducted in an inappropriate place." 152 In effect, the court
found strict liability despite the common sense intuition that crop dusting may
be quite appropriate in a valley in which its use by farmers is prevalent. In
tandem with the earlier application of strict liability to trucking on highways,
153
the Langan decision suggests that the Washington Supreme Court implicitly ap-
plies strict liability to hazardous activities that are appropriate to the place in
which they occur.
The Langan court's treatment of the final Restatement (Second) factor,
which assesses an activity's value to the community, suggests that this factor
also does not constitute a part of that court's strict liability analysis. Again, the
court asserted that this factor was met, but its analysis suggested not only that
the court ignored this factor but also that the loss spreading policy played a role
in its decision. The Langan court stated, "There is no doubt that pesticides are
socially valuable in the control of insects, weeds and other pests. They may
benefit society by increasing production." 154 Unembarrassed by its departure
from Restatement analysis, the court went on to define the Restatement (See-
147. Langan, 88 Wash. 2d at 864, 567 P.2d at 223 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 520 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
151. Langan, 88 Wash. 2d at 864, 567 P.2d at 223.
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 131-41 and accompanying text (discussing Siegler).
154. Langan, 88 Wash. 2d at 865, 567 P.2d at 223.
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ond) value to the community factor so that, contrary to the intent of the Restate-
ment (Second), it did not limit liability but became instead a vehicle for
implementation of the loss spreading policy.
First, the Langan court hinted at its hostility toward the restrictive ap-
proach of the Restatement (Second):
As a criterion for determining strict liability, [the value to the commu-
nity] factor has received some criticism among legal writers. [Profes-
sors Harper and James in their 1968 supplement] suggest that [this
factor] is not a true element of strict liability: "The justification for
strict liability, in other words, is that useful but dangerous activities
must pay their own way."
155
The court then converted this Restatement (Second) factor into an inquiry en-
tailing loss spreading and enterprise liability considerations. The court stated
that in choosing between strict liability and negligence, "we must ask who
should bear the loss caused by the pesticides,"' 156 citing for this proposition Jus-
tice Rosellini's concurring opinion in Siegler, which had relied on the loss
spreading policy. 157 The Langan court then noted the harm to plaintiff, and
contrasted the fact that defendants, "on the other hand, will all profit from the
continued application of pesticides. Under these circumstances, there can be an
equitable balancing of social interests only if [defendants] are made to pay for
the consequences of their acts." 158
The Washington Supreme Court's Siegler and Langan decisions illustrate a
developing body of strict liability doctrine, which focuses on the hazardousness
of an enterprise's activity and the loss spreading policy. This case law has devel-
oped independently of and more expansively than the Restatement.159
Although the Washington court purported to adhere to the Restatement (Sec-
ond),1 60 other jurisdictions have explicitly rejected the restrictions of the Re-
155. Id. at 864, 567 P.2d at 223 (quoting 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 14.4
comment (Supp. 1968)).
156. Id. at 865, 567 P.2d at 223.
157. Siegler, 81 Wash. 2d at 448, 502 P.2d at 1188 (Rosellini, J., concurring); see supra text
accompanying note 141.
158. Langan, 88 Wash. 2d at 865, 567 P.2d at 223. For further discussion of Langan, see infra
text accompanying notes 359-62.
159. In Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), a Florida appellate
court applied strict liability to the operation of a phosphate rock mine in which defendant collected
phosphate slimes in settling ponds. Approximately one billion gallons of slime had escaped due to a
dam break. The court imposed strict liability even though defendant's property was located in an
area that is the largest producer of phosphate rock in Florida, even though Florida produces 80% of
the nation's marketable phosphate rock and one-third of world production, and even though the
storing of phosphate slimes in diked settling ponds is an essential part of the traditional method of
mining phosphate rock. Conceding that the appropriateness to the place and value to the commu-
nity factors cut against strict liability, the court wrote:
In the final analysis, we are impressed by the magnitude of the activity and the attendant
risk of enormous damage. The impounding of billions of gallons of phosphatic slimes be-
hind earthen walls which are subject to breaking even with the exercise of the best of care
strikes us as being both 'ultrahazardous' and 'abnormally dangerous,' as the case may be
.... We conclude that the Cities Service slime reservoir constituted a nonnatural use of
the land such as to invoke the doctrine of strict liability.
Id. at 803.
160. In New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 102 Wash. 2d 495, 687
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statement and Restatement (Second), together with their underlying premises.
The Oregon Supreme Court has expressly deviated from the Restatement
approach in two important decisions. In Loe v. Lenhardt,'6' a 1961 crop dust-
ing case cited by the Washington Supreme Court in Langan,t62 the Oregon
Supreme Court flatly rejected the proposition that common usage could defeat
the claim that crop dusters should be held strictly liable for their activities:
"However common may be the practice of spraying chemicals by airplane, the
prevalence of the practice does not justify treating the sprayer and the 'sprayee'
as the law of negligence treats motorists, leaving each to fend for himself unless
one can prove negligence against the other."
163
In Koos v. Roth 16 4 the Oregon court in 1982 expressed dissatisfaction with
the Restatement (Second), specifically with the value to the community and ap-
propriateness to place factors. In Koos the court applied strict liability to a
farmer who employed field burning as an agricultural technique. Defendant and
amici curiae had "press[ed] upon [the court] the economic importance of the
grass seed industry, which makes extensive use of field burning, and of the forest
products industry, which is concerned about the potential implications for its
practices of burning trash and debris."' 65 The court, however, expressly re-
jected the Restatement (Second) value to the community factor. It found "at
least two reasons not to judge civil liability for unintended harm by a court's
view of the utility or value of the harmful activity."' 166 First, "[u]tility and value
often are subjective and controversial. They will be judged differently by those
who profit from an activity and those who are endangered by it, and between
one locality and another."'167 Second, the court noted that "the conclusion does
not follow from the premise."'168 The court pointed out that "[i]n an action for
damages, the question is not whether the activity threatens such harm that it
should not be continued."' 69 Rather, the
question is who shall pay for harm that has been done. The loss has
P.2d 212 (1984), the Washington Supreme Court refused to apply strict liability to the underground
piping of natural gas. The majority wrote that in Washington "[s]trict liability is imposed when the
conditions of the Restatement (Second)... are met," id. at 500, 687 P.2d at 215, and concluded they
were not met in this case. Id. at 501, 687 P.2d at 216. Justice Rosellini, joined by two other justices,
dissented, writing that
the court in Siegler did not feel compelled to slavishly total the number of factors in favor
of imposition against those that did not. Instead, the court recognized the extreme hazard
involved with the handling of this product and concluded sound policy dictated imposition
of strict liability. In the same way, sound policy considerations dictate imposition of strict
liability here.
Id. at 505-06, 587 P.2d at 218 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). For a discussion of New Meadows, which
suggests that courts are likely to apply a strict liability rule to the underground piping of natural gas,
see infra note 435. ;
161. 227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961).
162. Langan, 88 Wash. 2d at 860, 567 P.2d at 220-21.
163. Loe, 227 Or. at 253, 362 P.2d at 318.
164. 293 Or. 670, 652 P.2d 1255 (1982).
165. Id. at 679, 652 P.2d at 1261.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 680, 652 P.2d at 1262.
169. Id.
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occurred. It is a cost of the activity whoever bears it. To say that
when the activity has great economic value the cost should be borne by
others is no more or less logical than to say that when the costs of an
activity are borne by others it gains in value.
170
The Koos court also disapproved of the Restatement (Second) appropriate-
ness to place factor. It emphasized that "the focus in our cases has been on
assessing abnormal hazards by their potential for harm of exceptional magnitude
or probability despite the utmost of care." 17 1 The court recognized that "[t]his
potential may, of course, differ with the place where the activity is con-
ducted."'17 2 However, the court made clear that '"an activity is not otherwise
immune from strict liability because it is 'appropriate' in its place."
173
In 1978 the Alaska Supreme Court contributed to the growing body of con-
temporary hazardous activity cases. In Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co. 17 4 the court reached the unremarkable conclusion that
strict liability should be applied to the detonation of a magazine of explosives.1
7 5
The path the court took to reach this conclusion, however, is significant. De-
fendant argued that the last two factors of the Restatement (Second)-appropri-
ateness to the place and value to the community-should preclude strict
liability. 176 The court disagreed and concluded that the Restatement (Second)
could justify strict liability in such a case. 17 7 The opinion, however, reached
beyond this relatively limited conclusion.
The Yukon court expressly disapproved of the appropriateness to the place
factor of the Restatement (Second), and employed an analysis apparently influ-
enced by enterprise liability considerations. The court stated that the
reasons for imposing absolute liability on those who have created a
grave risk of harm to others by storing or using explosives are largely
independent of considerations of locational appropriateness. We see
no reason for maling a distinction between the right of a homesteader
to recover when his property has been damaged by a blast set off in a
170. Id.
171. Id. at 680, 652 P.2d at 1263. Even more recently, in Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 299
Or. 551, 704 P.2d 118 (1985), the court stated that it "has never explicitly relied upon the six Re-
statement factors in determining whether a given activity is abnormally dangerous." Id. at 556, 704
P.2d at 120 (design, marketing, and sale of easily concealed handgun not abnormally dangerous
activity). The court wrote that it "does not necessarily adhere to the six factors listed in section 520
when determining whether an activity qualifies as abnormally dangerous." Id. at 557, 704 P.2d at
121. With respect to Burkett's handgun holding, compare Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 497
A.2d 1143 (1985) (manufacturer and marketer of "Saturday Night Special" strictly liable, though
not on abnormally dangerous theory); see also Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192
(E.D. La. 1983) (manufacture and marketing of handguns can constitute ultrahazardous activity),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985) (marketing of
handguns not ultrahazardous activity).
172. Koos, 293 Or. at 682, 652 P.2d at 1263.
173. Id. For a discussion of the court's treatment of the "hazardousness" concept, see infra
notes 342-48 and accompanying text. For further discussion of Koos, see infra text accompanying
notes 342-47, 369-75.
174. 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1978).
175. Id. at 1211-12.
176. Id. at 1209.
177. Id. at 1211-12.
1987]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
remote corner of the state, and the right to compensation of an urban
resident whose home is destroyed by an explosion originating in a set-
tled area.' 78
The court suggested an enterprise liability rationale for this position: "In each
case, the loss is properly to be regarded as a cost of the business of storing or
using explosives."
179
By explicitly disapproving of the appropriateness to place factor of the Re-
statement (Second), the Alaska court joined the Oregon court in making explicit
that which was implicit in Washington's Siegler and Langan decisions.18 0 The
Alaska Supreme Court, however, went even further and expressed fundamental
dissatisfaction with the entire Restatement (Second) framework of analysis. The
court correctly perceived that the Restatement (Second) factors resemble negli-
gence considerations, restrict the growth of strict liability rules, and thwart en-
terprise liability principles. It stated that the "Restatement (Second) approach
requires an analysis of degrees of risk and harm, difficulty of eliminating risk,
and appropriateness of place, before absolute liability may be imposed. Such
factors suggest a negligence standard."' 81 In the court's view
[a]bsolute liability is imposed on those who store or use explosives be-
cause they have created an unusual risk to others. As between those
who have created the risk for the benefit of their own enterprise and
those whose only connection with the enterprise is to have suffered
damage because of it, the law places the risk of loss on the former.'8 2
Based on this perspective the Yukon court rejected the entire Restatement (Sec-
ond) framework in explosives cases: "[W]e do not believe that the Restatement
(Second) approach should be used in cases involving the use or storage of explo-
sives."18 3 The court preferred to rest its strict liability holding on existing case
law, "adher[ing] to the rule of Exner v. Sherman Power Construction Co.' 84 and
its progeny imposing absolute liability in such cases.... [I]n cases involving the
storage and use of explosives we take [the] question to have been resolved by
more than a century of judicial decisions."' 185
Even though the California Supreme Court has not ruled on the applicabil-
ity of the hazardous activity strict liability doctrine since 1948, it has contrib-
uted significantly to the expansive body of case law that stands in contrast to the
restrictive Restatement approach.1 86 Two of its early cases, Green v. General
178. Id. at 1211.
179. Id.
180. See supra notes 131-58 and accompanying text. The authors of the Prosser and Keeton
hornbook, citing Yukon, argue that appropriateness to the surroundings "is of doubtful importance
on the question of whether one should be strictly liable when engaging in a highly dangerous activ-
ity." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 78, at 555.
181. Yukon, 585 P.2d at 1211.
182. Id. at 1212.
183. Id. at 1211.
184. 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931) (A. Hand, J.) (imposing absolute liability on storage and use of
explosives).
185. Yukon, 585 P.2d at 1211.
186. See Levy & Ursin, Tort Law in California: At the Crossroads, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 497, 498-
500 (1979).
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Petroleum Corp.,187 decided in 1928, and Luthringer v. Moore,188 decided in
1948, still represent leading precedents in this area of the law 18 9 Like the deci-
sions previously discussed, they appear inconsistent with the Restatement.
Moreover, because Green was decided prior to the promulgation of the first Re-
statement and Luthringer prior to the Restatement (Second), these cases suggest
that both Restatements fail to "restate" the law. Developments in California
subsequent to Luthringer confirm that California, under the influence of the loss
spreading policy, rejects the Restatement approach.
In Green the California Supreme Court in 1928 extended strict liability be-
yond blasting and explosives cases to the nonnegligent operations of an oil com-
pany when, despite due care, the company's oil well had "blown out" and had
cast debris on plaintiff's property. The breadth of the Green court's previously
quoted strict liability principle, 190 together with its hint of an "enterprise" liabil-
ity rationale, stand in marked contrast to the first Restatement. Furthermore,
the Green holding itself appears inconsistent with the Restatement's common
usage criterion. 191
Drilling for oil, especially in an area where oil is prevalent, might be consid-
ered a matter of common usage and might well be carried on "by many people in
the community."' 9 2 The Green court's holding predated the first Restatement,
which accordingly "explained" that "the very nature of oil lands and the essen-
tial interest of the public in the production of oil require that oil wells be drilled,
but the dangers incident thereto are characteristic of oil lands and not lands in
general."'193 However, this "explanation" demonstrates tension between Green
and the Restatement approach. It could easily have been said that the very
nature of railroads and the essential interest of the public in railroad transporta-
tion of goods require that railways be constructed, but the dangers incident
thereto are characteristics of railroads and not lands in general. But, of course,
the drafters of the first Restatement did not envision imposing strict liability on
railroads. 194
The 1948 Luthringer decision extended the strict liability rule to a profes-
sional fumigator. In Luthringer gases had escaped from a fumigated basement
into an adjoining pharmacy, injuring plaintiff.' 95 The court, approving strict
liability in this situation, quoted extensively from the first Restatement. 196 Its
holding, however, went beyond previous applications of strict liability. More-
over, although the court discussed both Rylands v. Fletcher 197 and the Restate-
ment, it phrased its opinion carefully so that it was independent of both lines of
187. 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928).
188. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
189. See R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, supra note 3, at 590.
190. See supra text accompanying note 60.
191. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520(b) (1938).
192. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 comment e (1938).
193. Id.
194. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
195. Luthringer, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 492-94, 190 P.2d 1, 3 (1948).
196. Id. at 498-500, 190 P.2d at 6-8.
197. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868). Rylands is discussed supra text accompanying notes 22-30.
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authority. Indeed, one commentator at the time suggested that the court in-
tended to leave its doctrine in "a more flexible form than the [first]
Restatement." 19
8
In its discussion of Rylands the Luthringer court noted that subsequent
English cases had limited the doctrine of strict liability. The court then carefully
declined to rest its decision on Rylands.1 99 The court also quoted at length from
the first Restatement. 20 0 However, in reaching its decision to apply strict liabil-
ity to fumigation, the court returned to the broad pre-Restatement language of
Green: "[Tihere can be no doubt that the case of Green v. General Petroleum
Corp. ... enunciated a principle of absolute liability which is applicable to the
instant case."'20 ' Regarding what that principle of strict liability entailed, the
court first quoted the broad language from Green that has been previously set
out. 20 2 The Luthringer opinion then placed its own gloss on this statement of
law and policy: "The important factor is that certain activities under certain
conditions may be so hazardous to the public generally, and of such relative
infrequent occurrence, that it may call for strict liability as the best public
policy."
203
The Luthringer holding,204 like that of Green, appears inconsistent with
the Restatement's admonition that strict liability not apply to activities that are
a matter of common usage.20 5 Like the Washington Supreme Court's Siegler
and Langan decisions a quarter of a century later,20 6 however, the court in
Luthringer purported to find its holding consistent with the common usage crite-
rion.20 7 Fumigation, however, would seem to be a matter of common usage, as
demonstrated by the frequency with which "tented" houses are fumigated, let
alone the frequency of less conspicuous forms of fumigation. 208 The Luthringer
court stated that although gas "may be used commonly by fumigators .... they
are relatively few in number and are engaged in a specialized activity. It is not
carried on generally by the public, especially under circumstances where many
people are present, thus enhancing the hazard, nor is its use a common everyday
practice."'20 9 This quoted language on its face would apply to railroad as well as
fumigator activities. Although railroad companies commonly use trains, trains
are relatively few in number and railroad companies are engaged in a specialized
activity. This activity is not carried on generally by the public. Tension thus
exists between the Green and Luthringer holdings and the Restatement's re-
198. Comment, supra note 72, at 282.
199. Luthringer, 31 Cal. 2d at 500, 190 P.2d at 8.
200. Id. at 498-500, 190 P.2d at 7-8.
201. Id. at 500, 190 P.2d at 8.
202. See supra text accompanying note 60.
203. Luthringer, 31 Cal. 2d at 500, 190 P.2d at 8.
204. Id.
205. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520(b) (1938).
206. See supra notes 131-58 and accompanying text.
207. Luthringer, 31 Cal. 2d at 500, 190 P.2d at 8.
208. See R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, supra note 3, at 581.
209. Luthringer, 31 Cal. 2d at 500, 190 P.2d at 8.
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quirement that activities subjected to strict liability not occur as a matter of
common usage.
Furthermore, the holdings of Green and Luthringer, which predate the Re-
statement (Second), conflict with its final two factors-appropriateness to the
place and value to the community.210 Clearly, both oil wells and fumigation are
of value to the community. Similarly, one only drills for oil where it is thought
to exist, and fumigation is only conducted where structures are thought to need
fumigating. Indeed, there is no indication that either the Green or the Luthr-
inger court viewed the activity in question as inappropriate to the place. Taken
together, Green and Luthringer suggest not only that contemporary courts are
charting a course independent of the Restatement, but also that the Restatement
does not "restate" earlier leading cases.
In two important respects, Green and Luthringer also lay the groundwork
for the introduction of the loss spreading policy into hazardous activity cases.
First, the Green court broadly stated its strict liability rule and used the term
"enterprise" to characterize oil drilling activity.2 11 This language suggests an
emerging "enterprise liability" rationale that would extend beyond the tradi-
tional applications of strict liability, such as blasting and storage of explosives, to
other activities.2 12 Second, the California Supreme Court in Green supported its
strict liability rule by stating that the oil drilling defendant "should, in all fair-
ness, be required to compensate the other for the damage done."' 213 Then in
Luthringer, twenty years later, the court offered a new formulation to explain
the desirability of strict liability: "The important factor is that certain activities
under certain conditions may be so hazardous to the public generally, and of
such relative infrequent occurrence, that it may well call for strict liability as the
best public policy."' 214 The shift from the Green court's emphasis on "fairness"
to the Luthringer court's emphasis on "public policy" might seem relatively in-
nocuous. Luthringer, however, was a 1948 decision of the California Supreme
Court whose leading member, Justice Roger Traynor, just four years previously
had urged the adoption of strict products liability rules premised on the "public
policy" that accident costs should be spread among the public.
21 5
The Luthringer court's reference to public policy was a harbinger of things
to come. With the ascendency of the loss spreading policy during the tort
revolution of the past quarter century, it was inevitable that this policy would
also take hold in California hazardous activity cases. In a 1967 decision, Smith
v. Lockheed Propulsion Co.,2 16 the California Court of Appeal applied hazardous
activity strict liability to the test firing of a rocket motor that resulted in damage
to nearby property. The Smith court recognized the significance of the Luthr-
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 520(e) & (f) (1977).
211. See supra text accompanying note 60.
212. See infra notes 327-437 and accompanying text.
213. Green, 205 Cal. at 334, 270 P. at 955 (emphasis added).
214. Luthringer, 31 Cal. 2d at 500, 190 P.2d at 8 (emphasis added).
215. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Tray-
nor, J., concurring).
216. 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967).
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inger court's emphasis on public policy; after determining that the rocket test
firing entailed an inherent risk that defendant could not eliminate by the exercise
of due care, the court, citing Luthringer, stated that "[i]n these circumstances,
public policy calls for strict liability. ' 217 The court then elaborated on what
"public policy" meant in 1967: "Defendant, who is engaged in the enterprise for
profit, is in a position best able to administer the loss so that it will ultimately be
borne by the public."
'218
The implications of these California cases were made clear in a 1975 federal
court decision. In Chavez v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.219 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California, applying California
law, placed heavy emphasis on the loss spreading policy and rejected a specific
Restatement restriction on strict liability. Chavez demonstrates the similarity of
California hazardous activity law to the law of the states previously discussed.
In Chavez defendant railroad was hauling bombs pursuant to a naval contract
when the bombs exploded. Defendant pointed out that the first Restatement,
the Restatement (Second), and the apparent weight of judicial authority specifi-
cally precluded strict liability when common carriers are required to transport
explosives due to their status as common carriers. 220 The Chavez court had to
determine whether California courts would adhere to this "public duty excep-
tion" to strict liability.221 After an extensive survey of California tort law and
policy, the court concluded "that California would... find that carriers engaged
in ultrahazardous activity are subject to strict liability," despite the clearly con-
tradictory Restatement rule.222
The Chavez court employed a particularly illuminating methodology to
reach its conclusion. The court first traced the history of hazardous activity
strict liability in California law. It viewed the 1928 Green223 case as adopting a
strict liability rule based on a "fairness" rationale.224 This fairness rationale,
however, "has been undergoing a metamorphosis. '225 The 1948 Luthringer
226
case justified its "result by reference to an unspecified public policy."' 2 2 7 Smith
v. Lockheed,228 in turn, "gave substance to the vague reference in Luthringer to
the 'best public policy,' and provided California courts with a rationale other
217. Id. at 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (citing Luthringer, 31 Cal. 2d at 500, 190 P.2d at 8).
218. Id.
219. 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1976).
220. Id. at 1213; see Indiana Harbor Belt Ry. v. American Cyanamid Co., 517 F. Supp. 314
(N.D. I11. 1981) (applying strict liability to carrier of hazardous chemical); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 521 (1938) (stating rule); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 521 (1977) (stating rule); see also
EAC Timberline v. Pisces, Ltd., 745 F.2d 715 (Ist Cir. 1984) (applying negligence standard to ship
carrying explosives).
221. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. at 1207-12.
222. Id. at 1214.
223. 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928).
224. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. at 1213-14.
225. Id. at 1207.
226. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
227. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. at 1207.
228. 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967).
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than the primitive appeal to 'fairness.' "229 Thus, the Chavez court concluded
that "one public policy now recognized in California as justifying the imposition
of strict liability for the miscarriage of an ultrahazardous activity is the social
and economic desirability of distributing the losses, resulting from such activity,
among the general public."'230 The court also analyzed the California products
liability cases from Justice Traynor's 1944 concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. 2 31 through the strict products liability developments of the 1960s
and 1970s.2 3 2 After documenting the central role of the loss spreading policy in
California strict products liability, the Chavez court concluded that "the risk
distribution justification for imposing strict liability is well suited to claims aris-
ing out of the conduct of ultrahazardous activity."
'2 33
After concluding that California law recognized a hazardous activity strict
liability rule premised on the loss spreading policy, the Chavez court assessed the
Restatement's exclusion of strict liability for common carriers acting under a
public duty. The court first disposed of the argument that it must apply the
Restatement's exclusion because California "adopted" the Restatement of Torts
in Luthringer. The court correctly recognized that "[a]lthough [the California
Supreme Court in Luthringer] quoted at length from the Restatement of Torts
.... it reached its decision in reliance on the case of Green v. General Petroleum
Corp. [and] by reference to... public policy .... -234 Thus, the Chavez court
concluded that the California Supreme Court has not adopted either the Re-
statement generally or its specific public duty rule.235 It conceded, however,
that if strict liability was "predicated ... solely upon the 'fairness' rationale
appearing in the Green case, it might well find that strict liability was inappro-
priate."' 236 A fairness rationale suggests that strict liability is imposed because
"an antisocial act is being redressed. Where the carrier has no choice but to
accept dangerous cargo and engage in an ultrahazardous activity ... [t]he car-
rier is innocent. '237 The Chavez court observed, however, that the loss spread-
ing policy had supplanted the fairness rationale in California. The court
concluded that
there is no logical reason for creating a "public duty" exception when
the rationale for subjecting the carrier to absolute liability is the car-
rier's ability to distribute the loss to the public. Whether ... free to
reject or bound to take the explosive cargo . .. [defendant] is in a
position to pass along the loss to the public.
238
Chavez thus demonstrates the implications of contemporary judicial meth-
odology in hazardous activity strict liability cases. As courts increasingly recog-
229. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. at 1208.
230. Id.
231. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J. concurring).
232. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. at 1208-09.
233. Id. at 1209.
234. Id. at 1207.
235. Id. at 1212-14.
236. Id. at 1213.
237. Id. at 1213-14.
238. Id. at 1214.
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nize the applicability of the loss spreading policy to hazardous activity cases,
they are likely to reject Restatement restrictions on strict liability and to apply
strict liability in situations in which it would be precluded by the
Restatement.
239
B. Contemporary Tort Policy
As this Article has explained,24° when the idea of imposing strict liability
on hazardous activities first surfaced in the nineteenth century, it met a hostile
reception in courts that saw even negligence liability as a threat to the nation's
economic well being.24 1 The drafters of the first Restatement, in turn, were hos-
tile to strict liability and to the loss spreading policy that could lead to the adop-
tion of new strict liability rules.242 The Restatement's restrictions on strict
liability may have fairly represented the bulk of case law through the 1930s, even
if they conflicted with the expansive implications of cases such as Bridgeman-
Russell, Green, and Exner.
243
The first Restatement, 244 and the even greater restrictiveness of the Restate-
ment (Second), 245 however, contrast sharply with tort developments of the past
quarter century. During this period courts have expanded tort liability dramati-
cally in an attempt to protect individuals from unexpected hazards.24 6 In the
context of these developments, the treatment of the Restatement by contempo-
rary courts is hardly surprising.
The strict products liability decisions serve as the most conspicuous exam-
ple of this modem development; these decisions also articulate most clearly the
policies that guide the development of contemporary tort law.247 Courts have
emphasized that strict products liability serves the loss spreading policy. As
Justice Traynor stated in his classic Escola concurrence, the "cost of an injury
and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person
injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufac-
turer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business." 248 During
the past quarter century, this loss spreading policy has moved from a status of
239. The Iowa Supreme Court in National Steel Serv. Center, Inc. v. Gibbons, 319 N.W.2d 269
(Iowa 1982), adopted the Chavez result and rejected the common carrier exception. Like the Chavez
court, the Iowa Supreme Court based its holding on the loss spreading policy: "We believe it is more
likely in the generality of cases that a carrier will be better able to bear the loss than the party whose
property is damaged. Moreover, the carrier is in a position to spread the risk of liability among the
beneficiaries of its services." Id. at 272. In addition, the "carrier was in a better position to investi-
gate and identify the cause of the accident. When an accident destroys the evidence of causation, it
is fairer for the carrier to bear the cost of that fortuity." Id. Finally, "the carrier is in a superior
position to develop safety technology to prevent such accidents, and assessment of accident costs is
one means of inducing such developments." Id.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 22-33.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 34-47.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 65-93.
243. For discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 51-63.
244. See RESTATEMENT OF ToRrS §§ 519, 520 (1938).
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977).
246. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 963.
247. Levy & Ursin, supra note 186, at 501-04.
248. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
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questionable legitimacy 249 to wide acceptance as a justification for strict prod-
ucts liability. 250 In addition, courts have viewed strict products liability as in-
trinsically fair because it recognizes contemporary expectations of safety by
awarding compensation when a product defect violates these expectations. 251
Finally, strict liability creates desirable economic incentives for product
safety. 252 Courts have emphasized that public policy "demands that responsibil-
249. See Seavey, Cardozo, supra note 82, at 373; Ursin, supra note 1, at 287-95; see generally
Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REv. 401 (1959) (expressing skepticism
toward loss spreading policy).
250. Courts and commentators have widely accepted the loss spreading policy articulated by
Justice Traynor in his seminal Escola concurring opinion, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Tray-
nor, J., concurring), as a justification for strict products liability. See, eg., PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, § 98 at 692-94; Ursin, supra note 1, at 301-03. California Supreme Court justices have
expressly reiterated the loss spreading rationale in leading tort decisions and opinions. See, eg.,
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611-14, 607 P.2d 924, 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 144-45 (Mosk, J.) (imposing industry-wide liability for the drug DES), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736-38, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168-69, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 386-87 (1978) (Richardson, J.) (applying comparative fault to strict products liability);
Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 29-34, 560 P.2d 3, 8-11, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579-82 (1977)
(Wright, J.) (liability of successor corporation); Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 765-66, 478
P.2d 465, 469-70, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749-50 (1970) (Tobriner, J.) (shifting burden of proof on causa-
tion to defendant); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 248, 466 P.2d 722, 723, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178,
179 (1970) (Sullivan, J.) (extending strict liability to commercial bailors); Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal.
2d 399, 420-21, 426 P.2d 525, 540, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 140 (1967) (Tobriner, J., concurring) (propos-
ing strict liability rule for specified accidents during medical treatment); Seely v. White Motor Co.,
63 Cal. 2d 9, 20-21, 403 P.2d 145, 152-53, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24-25 (1965) (Peters, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing for applicability of strict liability to economic harm); Greenman
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-63, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963)
(Traynor, J.) (adopting strict products liability); see also Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach School Dist.,
22 Cal. 3d 508, 524-27, 585 P.2d 851, 861, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11-12 (1978) (Clark, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (lamenting role of loss spreading policy).
The loss distribution goal, if followed to its logical conclusion, suggests mechanisms for dealing
with accident losses that would obviate the need for tort law. See P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COM-
PENSATION AND THE LAW 540-49, 628-31 (3d ed. 1980); G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS
46 (1970). Indeed, New Zealand recently has replaced its tort system with a comprehensive social
insurance system for accident compensation. See Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zealand:
The First Two Years, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1977). Courts, however, have relied on this policy to
move tort doctrine away from its nineteenth-century bias against compensation and into conform-
ance with contemporary values. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1069-70 n.5 (1956).
251. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
237 (1978); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function & Legal
Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974).
252. See, eg., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63, 391 P.2d 168, 171-72, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964); see also Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611, 607
P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144 (1980) (safety incentives justify reducing plaintiff's burden of
proving cause-in-fact), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). This posture toward the safety incentive
effects of strict liability is largely consistent with the economic analysis of Professor Calabresi. See,
eg., Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
Courts, however, appear not to have relied heavily on technical economic analysis in their develop-
ment of strict liability rules. See Traynor, supra note 3, at 366. Moreover, contemporary economic
theory does not supply definitive answers regarding the safety incentive effects of strict liability, as
opposed to negligence, rules. Compare Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra, (economic theory supports
strict liability) with Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 221 (1973) (eco-
nomic theory provides no basis for preferring either negligence or strict liability). For views skepti-
cal of economic analysis, see Gilmore, Product Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 103
(1970); Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 905 (1980).
Another justification advanced for strict liability is that, even when present, negligence may be
difficult to prove. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462-63, 150 P.2d 436,
443 (Traynor, J., concurring). The difficulty of proving negligence may, in turn, support the safety
incentive argument for strict liability. A realistic view of the tort system suggests that a negligence
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ity be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards of life and health
inherent in defective products that reach the market. '25 3 Product manufactur-
ers are in a position to minimize the potential accident toll, and strict liability
has created economic incentives for them to do so.
254
Strict products liability does not represent a unique and isolated doctrinal
development. The tort policies articulated in the products cases have influenced
courts to expand liability throughout the tort system. Activities that nineteenth-
century courts sheltered even from negligence liability now no longer receive
such immunity. 255 Similarly, strict liability has expanded beyond manufacturers
to include retailers,256 wholesalers, 257 and even lessors of products.2 58 Since the
adoption of strict products liability in the 1960s, various proposals for new areas
of strict liability have appeared, 25 9 and courts have rendered decisions that sug-
gest such new applications.260 Recently, the California Supreme Court adopted
a new rule of landlord strict liability, 26 1 premised on the loss spreading, fairness,
and safety considerations of the products cases.
262
standard often will not result in liability even when negligence, in fact, exists. Thus, in practice,
strict liability is better suited to creating incentives for safety. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra, at
1060; Ursin, supra note 3, at 829-30; see generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 98, at 693
(difficulty of proving negligence as a reason for strict liability).
253. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 129, 501 P.2d 1153, 1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433,
439 (1972) (quoting Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring)).
254. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 252, at 1055 passim.
255. Among the "immunity" doctrines that have been abolished are the following: Traditional
governmental immunity, eg., Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961); charitable immunity, eg., Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951);
intrafamily immunity, eg., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971)
(parental immunity); contributory negligence, eg., Li v. Yellow Cab. Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d
1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); and land occupier rules, eg., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
256. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 100, at 706-07 (discussing retailer strict
liability).
257. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
258. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); Cintrone v.
Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965). In Price the court rea-
soned that lessors "are able to bear the cost of compensating for injuries resulting from defects by
spreading the loss through an adjustment of the rental." Price, 2 Cal. 3d at 252, 466 P.2d at 726, 85
Cal. Rptr. at 182. Moreover, "the imposition of strict liability upon [the lessor] serves ... as an
incentive to safety." Id. at 252, 466 P.2d at 727, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 183. The court concluded that "the
paramount policy to be promoted by the [strict products liability] rule is the protection of otherwise
defenseless victims of manufacturing defects and the spreading throughout society of the cost of
compensating them." Id. at 251, 466 P.2d at 725-26, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82. The Prosser and
Keeton hornbook concludes that strict liability of lessors "would be the generally accepted view
today because there is no visible reason for any distinction between those engaged in the business of
renting and those engaged in the business of selling." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 104, at
719, § 104A, at 722.
259. See Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 414-21, 426 P.2d 525, 535-40, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 135-
40 (1967) (Tobriner, J., concurring) (certain medical accidents); Love, supra note 6 (landlords);
Traynor, supra note 3 (strict liability beyond products cases); Ursin, supra note 3 (business
premises).
260. E.g., Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 426 P.3d 525, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1967) (Tobriner, J.,
concurring); Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970).
261. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
262. In support of its holding the court in Becker reiterated the policy themes that had sup-
ported its products liability holdings, finding them also applicable to landlords. Thus, the court
reemphasized that the "paramount policy of the strict products liability rule remains the spreading
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This remarkable expansion of tort liability is best understood as part of
broader legal and societal changes. Indeed, as Professor Grant Gilmore has
demonstrated, "a comparable expansion of liability has been going on, notably
since 1900, over the whole spectrum of our law of civil obligations, alike in con-
tract and in tort. ' 2 6 3 During this period, "the legal rules and doctrines which
successfully immunized actors or enterprisers from liability have been in the
process of breakdown. ' '264 These common-law developments, in turn, mirror
broader societal changes. During the nineteenth century, economic conditions,
the perceived needs of industrialization, and the values of individualism2 6 5-the
"felt necessities" 266 of the time-may have supported the Holmesian view that
the "general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie where it
falls."
267
During the twentieth century, in contrast, American society has become
dissatisfied with this simple solution to the complex problem of injuries in an
industrial society. As a society we seek to protect individuals from unexpected
catastrophes. This century has seen a proliferation of programs and plans aimed
at affording this protection. Various forms of health, disability, liability, and
other insurance have bloomed. Similarly, legislative enactments, dating back to
the turn of the century, have included workers' compensation, social security,
compulsory automobile liability insurance, Medicare, and no-fault automobile
plans. Although hardly a comprehensive system, these programs demonstrate a
commitment to provide compensation to protect individuals from the over-
whelming economic loss that may result from vicissitudes of life such as acci-
throughout society of the cost of compensating otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing de-
fects." Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220. The court premised strict landlord tort
liability on considerations that have led to the development of strict products liability: the recogni-
tion of legitimate expectations of safety, promotion of safety, and the compensation of accident vic-
tims by spreading accident costs throughout society. "Absent disclosure of defects," the court
wrote, "the landlord in renting the premises makes an implied representation that the premises are
fit for use as a dwelling .. " Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219. Safety considera-
tions also point to a strict liability rule: "The tenant purchasing housing for a limited period is in no
position to inspect for latent defects in the increasingly complex modem apartment buildings or to
bear the expense of repair whereas the landlord is in a much better position to inspect for and repair
latent defects." Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219. From this realistic perspective, it
is clear that the "tenant renting the dwelling is compelled to rely upon the implied assurance of
safety made by the landlord." Id. at 465, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
Finally, compensation of the accident victim is desirable because "the landlord by adjustment of
price at the time he acquires the property, by rentals or by insurance is in a better position to bear
the costs of injuries due to defects in the premises than the tenants." Id. Summarizing these percep-
tions the court paraphrased the Greenman formulation, which provided that "the purpose of [strict]
liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are bome by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves." Id. at 465, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (citing Green-
man v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701
(1963)). The Becker court concluded that "strict liability ... must be applied to insure that the
landlord who markets the product bears the cost of injuries resulting from the defects 'rather than
the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.'" Id.
263. Gilmore, supra note 252, at 111.
264. Gilmore, supra note 252, at 112.
265. See supra note 45.
266. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Howe ed. 1963).
267. Id. at 76.
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dent, old age, sickness, and unemployment. 268 The adoption of strict products
(and now strict landlord) liability, as well as the expansion of tort and civil lia-
bility generally, constitute "part and parcel of [this] great shift" in societal
values.
269
Viewed against the backdrop of the evolution of tort law and social policy
during this century, it is thus no surprise that courts have recently adopted an
expansive approach toward liability for hazardous activity, often rejecting Re-
statement restrictions.270 For several decades these courts have engaged in an
extended effort to bring tort law into confluence with contemporary values by
expanding the reach of strict liability and tort liability generally. From this per-
spective it appears anomalous that the hazardous activity strict liability doctrine
lay dormant for as long as it did. Of course, the first Restatement greatly influ-
enced this dormancy. It was inevitable, however, that the policy perspectives of
contemporary tort law would be brought to bear on the hazardous activity doc-
trine. And when this occurred, the consequence was predictable. Loss spread-
ing, fairness, and safety considerations strongly support applications of strict
liability that conflict with the restrictions of the Restatement.
271
Consider, for example, applications of the hazardous activity doctrine dis-
cussed in the preceding section of this Article: oil drilling, fumigation, crop
dusting, commercial fuel hauling, agricultural field burning, and using explo-
sives in isolated areas. 272 Fairness, safety, and loss spreading considerations all
clearly support the application of strict liability to such activities whether or not
they meet Restatement criteria such as not being a matter of common usage.
273
Each of these activities endangers individuals who create no similar risk to
others and who often are powerless to affect the risk created by the hazardous
activity. In other words, these activities typically exhibit a "one-sidedness" 274 of
risk creation.
Fairness considerations support the application of strict liability to such
activities. It has long been recognized that the perceived fairness of a negligence
standard is based largely on a mutuality of risk creation between the plaintiff
and the defendant-that "mutuality of risk is one of the great foundation stones
on which the main structure of the law of negligence has been erected. '275 In
268. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 250, at 759.
269. Gilmore, supra note 252, at 115; see R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, supra note 3,
at xxxii-xxxiv; Traynor, supra note 3.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 130-239.
271. The products liability cases illustrate the readiness of courts to extend strict liability beyond
the reach of the Restatement. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 (1972) (rejecting Restatement (Second) approach to defect concept because of
conflict with strict liability principles and policy); see also Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,
573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (reaffirmation of Cronin and new definition of defect).
Compare Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, (1969)
(extension of strict liability to bystanders) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977)
(taking no position on bystander issue).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 130-239.
273. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(d) (1977).
274. See Vold, West & Wolf, Aircraft Operator's Liability for Ground Damage and Passenger
Injury, 13 NEB. L. BULL. 373, 380 (1935).
275. Id.
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the absence of such mutuality, however, "negligence doctrine loses its attraction
as being inherently fair."' 276 Thus, "where there is no reciprocity of risk...
absolute liability is apt to follow."
2 7 7
The fairness of a strict liability rule is also evident when one considers who
benefits from and who bears the risk of harm from these hazardous activities.
Typically, the entity conducting the hazardous activity derives economic benefit
from it. In contrast, innocent bystanders or neighbors, who do not directly ben-
efit from the activity, risk injury or harm.2 78 Under negligence principles, as
articulated in the Learned Hand test,2 7 9 the value of the activity provides a rea-
son not to require the defendant to compensate injured victims, because the risks
must outweigh the benefits for conduct to be deemed negligent. The unfairness
of the negligence requirement in such circumstances has been long and widely
noted.2 80 The negligence regime, in effect, provides that "the defendant's bene-
fits from his own conduct [form] a valid excuse for not paying the plaintiff for
harm that such conduct has caused."'281 In contrast, the strict liability rule re-
flects basic concerns of fairness:
[I]f the gains derived from certain activities are indeed as great as the
defendant contends, there is all the more reason why he should pay for
the harm those activities caused to the person or property of another,
for, as against an innocent plaintiff who has nothing to do with the
creation of the harm in question, it is only too clear that the defendant
who captures the entire benefit of his own activities should, to the ex-
tent the law can make it so, also bear its entire costs.
282
276. Id.
277. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REv. [continued as Nw.
U.L. REv.] 151, 156 (1946) (discussing Void, West & Wolf, supra note 274). More recently, Profes-
sor George Fletcher has urged that hazardous activity cases can be explained by a "rationale of
nonreciprocal risk-taking." Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537,
547 (1972). "[D]angerous activities, like blasting, fumigating, and crop dusting stand out as distinct,
nonreciprocal risks in the community. They represent threats of harm that exceed the level of risk to
which all members of the community contribute in roughly equal shares." Id. For further discus-
sion of Fletcher's view, see infra note 378.
Distinct fairness considerations also support the application of strict liability in hazardous activ-
ity cases. For example, the event causing injury also often results in "the destruction of cogent
evidence from which negligence or want of it may be proved or disproved." Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81
Wash. 2d 448, 454, 502 P.2d 1181, 1185 (1972), cerL denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973). Fairness suggests
that the defendant whose activity endangers the plaintiff should not escape responsibility simply
because his or her activity destroys the plaintiff's ability to prove negligence. Id.; see Peck, Negli-
gence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REv. 225, 240 (1971). Similarly,
"where the abnormally dangerous activity involves high risk of explosions, the one engaged in that
activity has a better opportunity to determine the cause of the incident and can therefore seek indem-
nification. The injured plaintiff can prove negligence as to a third party only with great difficulty."
New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 102 Wash. 2d 495, 506, 687 P.2d 212,
218 (1984) (Rosellini, J., dissenting); see also National Steel Serv. Center, Inc. v. Gibbons, 319
N.W.2d 269, 272 (Iowa 1982) (fairness of strict liability based on relative ability of parties to identify
cause of accident when evidence destroyed).
278. Vold, West & Wolf, supra note 274, at 382.
279. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.).
280. See Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 334, 270 P. 952, 955 (1928);
Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 158 Minn. 509, 511, 197 N.W. 971, 972 (1924); R. EP-
STEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 27 (1980); Void, West & Wolf, supra note 274, at 382.
281. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 280, at 27.
282. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 280, at 27.
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The strict liability rule also derives support from safety considerations. Ad-
vocates of an expansive doctrine of hazardous activity strict liability tradition-
ally have justified their position, in part, on the ground that strict liability will
create added incentives for safety on the part of enterprises engaged in hazard-
ous activities. 283 The same one-sidedness of risk creation that points to the fair-
ness of strict liability also supports this safety rationale. To minimize risks
courts should look to the enterprise that creates those risks, not the innocent
bystander or neighbor.284 The increased emphasis on safety considerations in
the case law and academic literature of the past quarter century gives new force
to these arguments.2 85 Courts increasingly have recognized that public policy
"demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the
hazards to life and health." 286 Enterprises engaged in hazardous activities, not
their potential victims, are in the best position to know of or learn about poten-
tial risks and to act to minimize those risks.287 And this is true whether or not
the Restatement criteria are met.
288
Finally, the loss spreading policy strongly supports a vigorous doctrine of
hazardous activity strict liability. Decades ago the loss spreading policy was
advanced as a reason to "stop compromising ... [and stifling the] scope" 289 of
this doctrine. At that time courts and commentators viewed the loss spreading
policy with suspicion, or even hostility.290 During the strict products liability
revolution, however, the loss spreading policy has achieved widespread recogni-
tion as a premise for tort law reform.
29 1
This policy finds ready application in hazardous activity cases. Entities
subject to strict liability have the capacity to spread accident costs in the course
of their business activities. Fumigators, crop dusters, commercial haulers of ex-
plosive fuels and the like all undoubtedly carry liability insurance, precisely be-
cause of the potential for injury intrinsic in these activities.292 Recognizing the
283. See Void, West & Wolf, supra note 274, at 382.
284. See Vold, West & Wolf, supra note 274, at 380; see generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 541-43 (1961) (discussion of hazardous
activity strict liability).
Judge Richard Posner, usually a critic of strict liability rules, see Posner, supra note 252, has
seen a safety rationale in hazardous activity strict liability cases.
In some cases it may be reasonably clear that only injurers, or only victims, can be
looked to for advances in safety technology or other adjustments that might minimize acci-
dent costs .... This analysis might explain the major pockets of strict liability in the law.
These include liability for damage caused by 'ultrahazardous' activities .... All are cases
where the potential victims of the injury are not in a good position to make adjustments
that might in the long run reduce or eliminate the risk of injury.
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw, § 6.11, at 140-41 (2d ed. 1977).
285. See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
286. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 129, 501 P.2d 1153, 1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433,
439 (1972) (quoting Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring)).
287. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 252, at 1067-74.
288. See Calabresi, supra note 284, at 542-43.
289. Gregory, supra note 11, at 395; see Vold, West & Wolf, supra note 274, at 383, 389-90.
290. See supra notes 82-97 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
292. Undoubtedly, a widely-shared perception exists that such activities should insure against
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"social and economic desirability of distributing the losses, resulting from [haz-
ardous] activity, among the general public,"' 293 courts are concluding that the
"risk distribution justification for imposing strict liability is well suited to claims
arising out of the conduct of [hazardous] activity."
294
The ready application of contemporary tort policy to hazardous activities
explains the willingness of courts in recent years to expand strict liability.
295 It
also explains why courts have disregarded or expressly rejected 29 6 Restatement
restrictions on strict liability. It becomes evident, however, that fairness, safety,
and loss spreading considerations suggest applications of strict liability beyond
those adopted by courts to date. The question thus arises as to what criteria
should guide courts in deciding future applications of strict liability.
C. The Emerging Hazardous Activity Doctrine
1. The Question of Line Drawing
The expansive implications of contemporary hazardous activity case law
and policy have yet to be fully realized. To date, courts, on a case by case basis,
have covertly and overtly rejected Restatement restrictions on strict liability,
while applying strict liability in a manner more expansive than that envisioned
by the Restatement. 297 These decisions suggest that courts also may apply strict
liability to other hazardous activities that today remain in the realm of negli-
gence law. 298 Once it is widely recognized that courts have abandoned the Re-
injuries they may cause. See Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv. L. REV. 401,
441 (1959).
293. Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (E.D. Cal. 1976).
294. Id. at 1209.
295. This Article focuses on the developing hazardous activity strict liability case law. While
some courts are expanding the reach of strict liability overtly, other courts are reaching "strict liabil-
ity" results by creative interpretation (or manipulation) of negligence doctrines such as res ipsa loqui-
tur. See, e.g., Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Minn. 1984) (res ipsa loquitur
applicable to escape of natural gas).
Some commentators have interpreted cases that have sanctioned res ipsa loquitur to imply that
strict liability would not apply to the activities involved in those cases. See PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, § 78, at 558; D. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 522 (1985). They cite the doctri-
nal ground that res ipsa loquitur applies only to accidents that do not ordinarily occur in the absence
of negligence. See, e.g., Newing v. Cheatham, 15 Cal. 3d 351, 359, 540 P.2d 33, 38-39, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 193, 198-99 (1975). In contrast, the Restatement and Restatement (Second) of Torts apply
strict liability only when the defendant cannot eliminate a risk of harm by an exercise of the specified
degree of care. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16; see also infra text accompanying notes
329-52 (discussing an alternative approach). In fact, however, expansive applications of res ipsa
loquitur and other negligence doctrines represent interim steps ultimately leading to overt applica-
tion of strict liability rules. See 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 146, § 14.4, at 207-
211. This process does not constitute a new phenomenon, nor is it confined to hazardous activity
cases. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 28 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring) (products liability); Ursin, supra note 3, at 846 (landowner cases).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 130-239.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 130-239.
298. Until recently observers have spoken uncertainly about the applicability of strict liability to
such obvious candidates as the hauling and storage of toxic wastes. See, eg., Ginsberg & Weiss,
Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 913-20
(1981); Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters and Disposers of Hazardous Wastes, 64
MINN. L. REV. 949, 969-76 (1980). In 1983, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court held a land-
owner strictly liable for harm caused by toxic wastes that it had stored on its property and that
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statement approach, important questions will arise: What activities will courts
subject to strict liability? And what criteria will courts use to make that
determination?
An analysis of the applicability of strict liability to various forms of trans-
portation demonstrates how these related questions could arise. Consider, for
example, an airliner that crashes into a schoolhouse, a train that derails and
crashes into a nearby convenience store, a gasoline loaded tanker truck that
overturns, explodes and incinerates a nearby car, and, finally, a routine traffic
accident involving two automobiles. For more than a century courts have ap-
plied negligence rules to railroad299 and traffic accidents. 30° Early decisions im-
posed strict liability on the venturesome activity of flying airplanes when their
crashes caused damage to persons or objects on the ground.3 01 As air travel has
become common and the safety record has improved, however, courts have
tended to refuse to impose strict liability on air traffic, 30 2 despite a special sec-
tion of the Restatement (Second) endorsing strict liability.
30 3
Recent hazardous activity decisions, however, suggest increased application
of strict liability to various forms of transportation. In a later section 3° 4 this
Article considers the issue of ground damage caused by aircraft as an example of
the expansive implications of hazardous activity doctrine and contemporary tort
policy. Fairness, safety, and loss spreading considerations clearly support strict
liability in this situation, and the case law unambiguously points in this direc-
tion. This case law and policy also suggest the applicability of strict liability to
the train derailment and tanker truck accidents.
If public policy and hazardous activity case law support the application of
strict liability to the aircraft, railroad, and tanker truck examples, the question
then arises whether courts will also apply strict liability to the routine traffic
accident. If courts, as expected, are reluctant to do so, the question will arise
whether criteria can be articulated to distinguish the routine traffic accident
from the other examples. After briefly discussing the apparent reluctance of
courts to apply strict liability rules to routine traffic accidents, 30 5 this Article
will examine the criteria for the application of hazardous activity strict liability
that are emerging in the case law. 30 6 These criteria would allow courts to distin-
flowed onto the property of others. State Dept. of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473,
488, 463 A.2d 893, 900 (1983).
299. E.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Gower, 85 Tenn. 465, 471, 3 S.W. 824, 826 (1887); see
Ehrenzweig, supra note 33, at 1430.
300. See, e.g., Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 444, 445 P.2d 513, 514, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897, 898
(1968) (Traynor, C.J.); Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 3d 528, 531, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739, 741
(1971).
301. See, e.g., Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 851-52, 266 N.Y.S. 469,
472-73 (1933); see also Baldwin, Liability for Accidents in Aerial Navigation, 9 MICH. L. REV. 20
(1910) (advancing the strict liability position).
302. See, e.g., Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, § 78, at 557-558.
303. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (1977).
304. See infra text accompanying notes 384-413.
305. See infra notes 307-25 and accompanying text.
306. See infra notes 327-81 and accompanying text.
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guish the routine traffic accident from the aircraft, railroad, and tanker truck
examples.
Even courts at the cutting edge of strict liability developments have balked
at the suggestion that they should apply strict liability rules to routine traffic
accidents. 30 7 As a matter of policy and doctrine, this reluctance might appear
puzzling. On a doctrinal level, the hazardousness of the automobile308 has sug-
gested to observers the difficulty of formulating a strict liability rule that would
apply to aircraft but not to automobiles. 30 9 On a policy level, the existence of
widespread (and often compulsory) liability insurance suggests that loss spread-
ing considerations support strict liability in automobile accidents. Fairness con-
cerns also come into play, especially when pedestrians or other bystanders are
injured by the hazardous activity of driving automobiles.3 10 Finally, strict liabil-
ity may promote safety by making drivers more aware of the true costs of their
activity; even if increased insurance rates fail to affect decisions made while driv-
ing, people might choose to drive less because of the increased cost, thereby
reducing the accident toll.
311
On the other hand, it may be argued that individual drivers of automobiles
differ significantly from operators of airlines. Commercial enterprises such as
airlines will treat liability costs as part of their overall business costs and make
adjustments in a manner different from individuals. Thus, the safety incentive
argument may have more force when applied to the operation of an airline.
31 2
Similarly, the airline passes on its accident and insurance costs to the public
through its fares. Thus, loss spreading has a different meaning in this context
than it does in the automobile context, raising fairness concerns as well.
3 1 3
In fact, judicial reluctance to adopt strict liability rules in the context of the
routine traffic accident may have less to do with "theoretical" concerns regard-
ing loss spreading, safety, and fairness than with more pragmatic concerns. In-
deed, the movement of no fault automobile insurance plans from academic
speculation to legislative reality in many states supports policy arguments in
favor of strict liability rules. 314 Nevertheless, courts have remained reluctant to
adopt strict liability rules in this area. Justice Traynor made perhaps the clear-
307. See, eg., Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 444, 445 P.2d 513, 514, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897, 898
(1968); Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 3d 528, 531, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739, 741 (1971).
308. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment i (1977).
309. See C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, supra note 78, at 504-05.
310. Fairness arguments for strict liability are less persuasive when a "mutuality of risk" ex-
ists-e.g., when each motorist "is exposing the other to the risk his vehicle will get out of hand."
Vold, West & Wolf, supra note 274, at 380; see Fletcher, supra note 277, at 548.
311. See Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE
L.J. 216, 223 (1965).
312. See Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 250
(1967).
313. See id.
314. See Spencer, Motor-Cars and the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher: A Chapter ofAccidents in the
History of Law and Motoring, 42 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 65 (1983) (discussion of strict liability and use of
automobiles in England). See generally O'Connell, Alternatives to the Tort System for Personal In-
jury, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 17, 22-26 (1986) (discussing no fault alternatives to tort law).
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est statement of the ground for this reluctance in 1968. In Maloney v. Rath3 15
the California Supreme Court, the pioneer in the adoption of the doctrine of
strict products liability, refused to apply strict liability to routine traffic acci-
dents. Writing for the court, Justice Traynor did not reject the desirability of
strict liability on the merits. Indeed, he expressly noted his "[awareness] of the
growing dissatisfaction with the law of negligence as an effective and appropriate
means for governing compensation for the increasingly serious harms caused by
automobiles. ' 316 The reason the court refused to adopt a strict liability rule was
a pragmatic, "legal process," reason. 3 17 A rule "of strict liability would require
its own attendant coterie of rules to allocate risk and govern compensation
among co-users of the streets and highways." 318 Judicial adoption of a strict
liability rule "without also establishing in substantial detail how the new rule
should operate would only contribute confusion to the automobile accident
problem."' 319 The court thus concluded that it would defer to the legislature
under such circumstances;3 20 the legislature could "avoid such difficulties by
enacting a comprehensive plan for the compensation of automobile accident
victims."
32 1
Whatever their reasons, courts to date have declined to adopt strict liability
rules in automobile accident cases, 322 even when they have adopted ambitious
strict liability rules in products cases3 2 3 and provocative approaches to hazard-
ous activity cases. 324 This reluctance continues despite the recognition that
driving automobiles is hazardous, even when done carefully.325 This reluctance
thus raises the question whether the hazardous activity case law that points to
strict liability rules for the aircraft, railroad, and tanker truck examples also
suggests criteria for distinguishing the routine traffic accident. The next section
of this Article examines this case law and discusses the doctrinal criteria for the
315. 69 Cal. 2d 442, 445 P.2d 513, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1968) (Traynor, C.J.).
316. Id. at 445, 445 P.2d at 514, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
317. For a critique of legal process objections to judicial innovation in tort law, see Ursin, supra
note 1, at 234-43.
318. Maloney, 69 Cal. 2d at 445-46, 445 P.2d at 515, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
319. Id. at 446, 445 P.2d at 515, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
320. The court's decision in 1968 to defer to the legislature does not mean that adoption of strict
liability rules for traffic accidents is beyond judicial competence in all historical contexts. For a
discussion of early English cases that "came within a whisker of imposing strict liability upon the
owner of a motor-car," see Spencer, supra note 314, at 65. See also Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 828, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975) (comparative fault adopted over legal
process objections).
321. Maloney, 69 Cal. 2d at 446, 445 P.2d at 515, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 899. But cf. Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 828, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975) (adopting comparative
negligence despite traditional arguments that only legislature could take this step because of neces-
sity to develop coterie of subsidiary rules); see also American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20
Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978) (adopting subsidiary rules).
322. See, e.g., Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 444, 445 P.2d 513, 514, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897, 898
(1968); Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 3d 528, 531, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739, 741 (1971).
323. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 597-98, 607 P.2d 924, 928,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136 (1980); see also Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 458-64, 698 P.2d 116,
118-22, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 215-19 (1985) (landlord strict liability).
324. See, e.g., Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 334, 270 P. 952, 954 (1928).
325. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment i (1977).
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imposition of strict liability suggested by this caselaw.3 26 On examination, the
leading hazardous activity cases suggest doctrinal criteria that would allow
courts to exclude the routine traffic accident from the purview of the expanding
strict liability doctrine. Under these criteria courts could sanction applications
of strict liability in new areas-including plane crashes, train derailments, and
tanker truck overturnings-while distinguishing the routine traffic accident.
2. The Emerging Criteria
Leading hazardous activity decisions suggest not only that courts are re-
jecting the Restatement's restrictions on strict liability, 327 but also that they are
articulating their own criteria to guide future applications of strict liability to
hazardous activities. Increasingly, courts have viewed the loss spreading capac-
ity of enterprises engaged in particular activities as an important factor in deter-
mining whether to impose strict liability.328 The hazardousness of an activity,
obviously, also constitutes an important factor. However, courts have relied on
a "hazardousness" concept distinct from that of the Restatement. Courts are
developing their own definition of the hazardousness necessary to subject an ac-
tivity to strict liability. Hazardousness alone, however, even as thus defined, is
not a sufficient condition for the imposition of strict liability. Rather, the case
law suggests that strict liability is appropriate only when the risk of harm cre-
ated by a hazardous enterprise is unlike the risks that individual citizens rou-
tinely create as part of their everyday activities. In other words, courts are
applying strict liability to "commercial hazards," as distinct from routine, every-
day hazards typically created by individual citizens.
As previously discussed,329 the first Restatement offered one definition of
hazardousness in the 1930s and the Restatement (Second) offered another in the
1970s. The first definition focused on whether activities "necessarily [involve] a
risk of serious harm... which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of utmost
care." 330 The second definition considered "(a) existence of a high degree of risk
of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the
harm that results from it will be great; [and] (c) inability to eliminate the risk by
the exercise of reasonable care."' 33 1 Each of these definitions, both undoubtedly
prompted by the early identification of blasting as subject to strict liability,
332
has the unfortunate characteristic of directing attention to whether a defendant
can eliminate the risk of harm by exercising some degree of care.
This inquiry has confused courts and led to a rejection of strict liability in
cases in which it should have been applied.333 Under the Restatement ap-
326. See infra notes 327-81 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 130-239 and accompanying text.
328. See, e.g., Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (E.D. Cal. 1976);
see supra notes 211-62 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 65-128 and accompanying text.
330. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
331. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
332. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 comments c & e (1977).
333. E.g., Bennett v. Larson Co., 118 Wis. 2d 681, 706, 348 N.W.2d 540, 554 (1984) (pesticide
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proach, if a court finds that strict liability is improper for a particular activity
because the defendant, exercising the requisite degree of care, could have elimi-
nated the risk of harm, it leaves future accident victims with the burden of prov-
ing negligence. In reality, however, even if negligence in fact exists, it may be
difficult or impossible to prove. 334 Moreover, the initial determination that the
risk could have been eliminated by some degree of care may have been mistaken.
Thus, reliance on the Restatement approach compounds the injustices for vic-
tims of accidents caused by a hazardous activity.
Contrary to the dictates of both the Restatement and the Restatement (Sec-
ond), the inquiry should focus on whether the activity is hazardous either be-
cause negligence may occur or because harm may occur even in the absence of
negligence. 335 If under this criterion the activity attains the requisite degree of
hazardousness, courts should apply strict liability without resort to the Restate-
ment criteria. Several decisions previously discussed 336 suggest this approach.
The California Supreme Court's Green v. General Petroleum Corp.3 3 7 and
Luthringer v. Moore338 decisions, for example, suggest that to be subject to strict
liability an activity need not present the sort of intrinsic grave danger of harm
associated with activities such as blasting. Green and Luthringer suggest a more
expansive application of strict liability. Indeed, the Luthringer opinion refers to
activities that "under certain conditions" may be hazardous. 339 The Luthringer
court applied strict liability to fumigation, 34° just as the Green court had applied
strict liability to the drilling of oil wells.341 Thus, the hazardousness factor in
California law points to the application of strict liability to activities that are
hazardous in the sense that fumigation and drilling for oil are hazardous.
A 1982 decision of the Oregon Supreme Court, Koos v. Roth,342 which ap-
plied strict liability to the burning of fields for agricultural purposes, 343 assists in
refining this hazardousness concept. The Koos court stated that "[w]hether the
danger is so great as to give rise to strict liability depends both on the probability
and on the magnitude of the threatened harm.''344 Thus, if "the consequences of
a mishap are potentially lethal or highly destructive of health or property, a
spraying); see also Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 655, 276 P.2d 92, 98 (1954) (strict liability
inapplicable to ground damage caused by aircraft).
334. See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 455-56, 502 P.2d 1181, 1185 (1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 983 (1973).
335. Under this approach an activity might exhibit the requisite degree of hazardousness because
negligence frequently causes mishaps. In this case the strict liability rule avoids litigation on the
negligence issue, while ensuring victim compensation. On the other hand, an activity might exhibit
the requisite degree of hazardousness even though negligence rarely causes mishaps. In such a case
traditional Restatement and Restatement (Second) grounds support strict liability.
336. See supra notes 130-239 and accompanying text.
337. 205 Cal. 328, 333-34, 270 P. 952, 954-55 (1928).
338. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
339. Id. at 500, 190 P.2d at 8 (emphasis added).
340. Id. at 496-500, 190 P.2d at 5-8.
341. Green, 205 Cal. at 331-35, 270 P.2d at 954-55.
342. 293 Or. 670, 652 P.2d 1255 (1982). For other discussion of Koos, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 164-73; infra text accompanying notes 369-75.
343. Koos, 293 Or. at 682-86, 652 P.2d at 1263-65.
344. Id. at 678, 652 P.2d at 1260.
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slight likelihood that they will occur suffices." 34 5 And this strict liability rule
applies "even if the harm in the actual occurrence is less severe."'346 On the
other hand,
even when the risk "only moderately threatens economic activities
rather than harm to life, health, or property or environment," the ac-
tivity may carry strict liability if the consequences are highly probable
or... if the activity can be carried on "only with a substantially un-
controllable likelihood that damage will sometimes occur."' 347
As an example of an activity in this latter category, the Koos court cited crop
dusting cases in which "the likely harm to any person from the aerial dissemina-
tion of chemicals was moderately severe but substantially uncontrollable."
348
The case law indicates that hazardousness, even as thus defined and even
when accompanied by a loss spreading capacity, does not constitute a sufficient
condition for the imposition of strict liability. Courts and commentators, for
example, have recognized that automobiles create a "residue of unavoidable risk
of serious harm that may result even from ... careful operation. ' '349 Despite
this hazardousness and a clear loss spreading capacity (especially when liability
insurance is compulsory), courts have stated clearly their reluctance to impose
strict liability in the ordinary automobile accident case.350 Thus, for example,
the Oregon Supreme Court, in applying strict liability to crop dusting, empha-
sized that "[h]owever common may be the practice of spraying chemicals by
airplane, the prevalence of the practice does not justify treating the sprayer and
'sprayee' as the law treats motorists, leaving each to fend for himself unless one
can prove negligence against the other.
'351
The case law, in fact, suggests a criterion for strict liability-in addition to
hazardousness-that distinguishes between the automobile accident and other
activities to which courts have applied strict liability. Under this criterion, strict
liability does not apply unless a defendant creates a "commercial hazard," a
hazard unlike those that individual citizens routinely create as part of their eve-
ryday activities. Thus, the crop duster is strictly liable, but the automobile
driver is not. Unlike crop dusting, driving an automobile is an activity that
citizens routinely engage in as part of their everyday activities. Similarly, a
345. Id.
346. Id. at 678, 652 P.2d at 1260-61.
347. Id. at 678, 652 P.2d at 1261 (quoting Bella v. Aurora Air, Inc., 279 Or. 13, 24, 566 P.2d
489, 495 (1977)). The authors of the Prosser and Keeton hornbook offer a similar formulation:
An activity can be ultrahazardous for two reasons: first, because although harm from
a mishap may not be very serious, and the social utility of the conduct may outweigh the
danger, a mishap resulting in some harm to the plaintiff is very likely to occur; second,
because the activity involves an appreciable chance of causing serious injury.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 78, at 556.
348. Koos, 293 Or. at 678, 652 P.2d at 1261 (citing Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312
(1961); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959)).
349. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment i (1977).
350. See, e.g., Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 444, 445 P.2d 513, 514, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897, 898
(1968); Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 3d 528, 531, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739, 741 (1971).
351. Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 253, 362 P.2d 312, 318 (1961) (also discussed supra text
accompanying notes 161-63).
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tanker truck that jackknifes on a freeway and spews burning fuel across the road
has, because of the size, cumbersomeness, and explosiveness of its cargo, created
a "commercial hazard," distinct from the routine, everyday hazards created by
individual citizens.
352
Before turning to an examination of the case law that suggests this "com-
mercial hazard" criterion, it is worth emphasizing that this criterion differs
greatly from the Restatement's common usage criterion. Indeed, the Oregon
crop-dusting case that drew the dichotomy between motoring and crop dusting
rejected the notion that common usage should negate strict liability.3 53 The Re-
statement's common usage criterion precludes strict liability for activities car-
ried on by many people in the community.354 In contrast, the "commercial
hazard" criterion would not preclude strict liability simply because an activity is
common or engaged in by many people in the community. Under this criterion
it is irrelevant that in a particular community many people drill for oil, fumigate
homes and offices, or engage in other activities that have been held subject to
strict liability. These activities, regardless of the number of people who engage
in them, differ from automobile driving because they create risks of harm unlike
the risks of harm routinely created by individual members of the public who
pursue their everyday activities. Moreover, the strict liability rule applies even if
these hazardous enterprises themselves create such risks as a part of their com-
mon everyday business practices.
The commercial hazard criterion finds both explicit and implicit recogni-
tion in the case law. At times courts have articulated this criterion explicitly in
applying strict liability and in explaining which activities are subject to strict
liability. At other times courts have employed this criterion implicitly while
"interpreting" the Restatement criteria so as to impose strict liability. An early
formulation of the commercial hazard criterion appears in the 1948 Luthringer
v. Moore355 decision. The Luthringer court emphasized that the "important fac-
tor is that certain activities under certain conditions may be so hazardous to the
public generally, and of such relative infrequent occurrence, that it may well call
for strict liability as the best public policy."' 3 5 6 And the court stated that fumi-
gation is not a matter of common usage because "[i]t is not carried on generally
by the public ... nor is its use a common everyday practice." 357 Thus, Luthr-
inger suggests as a criterion for the invocation of strict liability that courts in-
quire whether the activity creates a hazard unlike those generally created by
individual members of the public pursuing their everyday activities. Unlike the
352. According to a news report, interstate trucks are involved in twice as many fatal accidents
per mile traveled as automobiles. San Diego Tribune, April 22, 1985, § A, at 2, Col. 1.
353. Loe, 227 Or. at 251, 362 P.2d at 317.
354. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 comment e (1938).
355. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
356. Id. at 500, 190 P.2d at 8; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 78, at 556 (stating
criterion similar to those found in Luthringer, although not citing Luthringer).
357. Luthringer, 31 Cal. 2d at 500, P.2d at 8. The Luthringer court, of course, also attempted to
explain why the first Restatement's common usage test was met. See supra text accompanying notes
207-09.
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Restatement's common usage requirement, 358 the Luthringer criterion supports
the application of strict liability to the hazardous activity of fumigation, regard-
less of how commonly fumigation occurs or the number of fumigators in the
community.
The commercial hazard criterion also helps explain more recent applica-
tions of strict liability. It suggests, for example, why the Washington Supreme
Court in Langan v. Valicopters, Inc. 359 had little difficulty in applying strict lia-
bility to crop dusting, 360 despite an apparent conflict with the Restatement's
common usage requirement. The court blithely announced that all the Restate-
ment (Second) factors were met, despite its recognition of "the prevalence of
crop dusting," which was "ordinarily done in large portions of the Yakima Val-
ley" employing, in 1975, 287 aircraft. The court simply characterized the activ-
ity as one "carried on by a comparatively small number of persons" and
concluded that crop dusting was thus "not a matter of common usage."' 361 On
its face, this conclusion appears highly questionable.362 In light of the previous
analysis, however, the result is easily explained. Regardless of the number of
crop dusters in the community and the prevalence of this practice, crop dusting
creates risks of harm unlike those created by individual members of the commu-
nity pursuing their everyday activities.
This analysis is supported by the Washington Supreme Court's decision in
Siegler v. Kuhlman 363 which applied strict liability to the transportation of gaso-
line by a tanker truck. 364 The Siegler court emphasized the commercial hazards
present in such a situation. The court noted that gasoline "[s]tored in commer-
cial quantities" presented special dangers. 365 It thus followed that strict liability
was appropriate for the even "more highly hazardous act of transporting it as
freight upon freeways and public thoroughfares. ' 366 In this vein the court
stated that
[w]hen gasoline is carried as cargo-as distinguished from fuel for the
carrier vehicle-it takes on uniquely hazardous characteristics ....
Dangerous in itself, gasoline develops even greater potential for harm
when carried as freight-extraordinary dangers deriving from sheer
quantity, bulk and weight, which enormously multiply its hazardous
properties.
367
The Siegler court's analysis suggests how courts applying strict liability to
358. See RESTATEMENTr OF TORTS § 520(b) (1938).
359. 88 Wash. 2d 855, 567 P.2d 218 (1977).
360. Id. at 860-65, 567 P.2d at 221-23.
361. Id. at 864, 567 P.2d at 223. Langan is also discussed supra text accompanying notes 143-
58.
362. See Bennett v. Larson Co., 118 Wis. 2d 681, 704, 348 N.W.2d 540, 553 (1984) (refusing to
apply strict liability to pesticide spraying because it occurs commonly).
363. 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973). Siegler is also
discussed supra text accompanying notes 131-42.
364. Siegler, 81 Wash. 2d at 459-60, 502 P.2d at 1187.
365. Id. at 457, 502 P.2d at 1186.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 454, 502 P.2d at 1184.
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tanker trucks can, because of the commercial hazard criterion, stop short of
applying strict liability to routine traffic accidents. The driving of automobiles
creates inevitable hazards, including the possibility that an automobile's fuel
tank will explode in an accident, thus injuring bystanders. The commercial haz-
ard criterion is not met in such a situation, however, because the public gener-
ally drives automobiles as a common everyday activity. In contrast, strict
liability is proper when a tanker truck overturns and causes a gasoline explosion,
because the transport of gasoline in commercial quantities as cargo creates risks
unlike those created by individual members of the community pursuing their
everyday activities.
Oregon case law also supports this analysis. As previously mentioned, in
applying strict liability to crop dusting, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected the
notion that common usage defeats strict liability, at the same time that it ex-
pressly excluded automobile accidents from the ambit of its strict liability
rule.368 This posture implicitly reflects the commercial hazard concept.
More recently, in Koos v. Roth 369 the Oregon Supreme Court applied strict
liability to the agricultural technique of field burning, despite its appropriateness
to the location where it was conducted. 370 The court distinguished field burning
from activities not subject to strict liability,37 1 and in so doing it articulated a
criterion for strict liability virtually identical to the commercial hazard criterion
that this Article has discussed. In the court's view strict liability would not
apply to an activity, despite its dangerousness, if the activity occurs as a "wide-
spread and accepted individual practice," one which "nearly everyone routinely
does . . 372 Just as the commercial hazard criterion distinguishes between
routine traffic accidents and overturning tanker trucks, so did the Koos court
distinguish between agricultural field burning and the individual "backyard
burner. ' 373 The agricultural field burner creates hazards "beyond the ordinary
risks associated with common uses of fire that are readily avoided by due
care." 374 The court concluded that field burning would expose a defendant to
368. Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 252, 362 P.2d 312, 318 (1961).
369. 293 Or. 670, 652 P.2d 1255 (1982). Koos is also discussed supra text accompanying notes
164-73, 342-48.
370. Koos, 293 Or. at 683-86, 652 P.2d at 1263-65.
371. Id. at 685, 652 P.2d at 1265.
372. Id. at 682, 652 P.2d at 1263. Koos also suggests an alternative test-whether the activities
in question are "essential service activities." Id. The court viewed this test as an "extension" of the
common usage criterion. Id. Strict liability would be precluded for an activity "if nearly everyone
routinely does it or expects to have it done for him." Id. Apparently the Koos court intended this
alternative definition to exclude the application of strict liability to the distribution of water, gas,
electricity, and other common goods. See id. This restriction on strict liability would seem to run
afoul of Washington's application of strict liability to the hauling of gasoline as freight, Siegler v.
Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973), and perhaps to
California's application of strict liability to fumigation, Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190
P.2d 1 (1948), and oil drilling, Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P.2d 952
(1928). Unless carefully qualified, the Koos court's alternative definition would seem both unsound
and in conflict with the California and Washington approaches. For a discussion of the extension of
strict liability to such activities as the distribution of water and gas, see infra notes 419-35 and
accompanying text.
373. Koos, 293 Or. at 685, 652 P.2d at 1265.
374. Id.
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strict liability because it is not "an ordinary activity that many people routinely
expect to do for themselves, like [burning a] domestic fire."
' 3 7 5
The case law thus appears not only to impose strict liability in a manner
inconsistent with the Restatement but also to suggest an alternative to the Re-
statement's common usage criterion. Under this commercial hazard criterion,
even "hazardous" activities would not subject a defendant to strict liability un-
less they create risks unlike those routinely created by individual members of the
community pursuing their everyday activities. 376 Or, as the Koos court sug-
gested, strict liability would not apply to widespread and accepted individual
practices that everyone routinely engages in.
From a policy perspective, this criterion achieves beneficial results. It iden-
tifies activities that typically endanger persons who create no similar risk to
others and who are powerless to protect themselves. 37 7 The fairness378 of im-
375. Id. at 686, 652 P.2d at 1265.
376. Under the commercial hazard criterion, enterprises are strictly liable when they create risks
of harm unlike those that individual citizens routinely create as part of their everyday activities.
Thus, strict liability would apply to ground damage from airplane crashes but not to routine traffic
accidents. See infra notes 382-413 and accompanying text. Similarly, strict liability would apply to
a water company's water mains, but not to water pipes in an individual's residence. See infra text
accompanying notes 419-34. Under this criterion, however, the water company would not be strictly
liable for activities that create risks which are similar to those individual citizens routinely create.
Thus, the water company would not be strictly liable under the hazardous activity doctrine for
injuries that occur when a customer's chair collapses in the company's lobby under the customer's
weight. The chair in the lobby does not constitute a commercial hazard. But cf. Ursin, supra note 3
(suggesting strict liability under different theory).
Under the commercial hazard criterion the professional fumigator would be strictly liable for
escaping gas, but the homeowner would not be strictly liable in his or her use of ant sticks or flea
bombs. If an individual creates risks of harm that meet the commercial hazard criterion, however,
strict liability would apply. Thus, an individual who uses professional strength poisons to fumigate
his or her residence would be strictly liable for resulting harms. Similarly, an individual who uses
dynamite to blast tree stumps in his or her back yard would be strictly liable because the risk created
is unlike those routinely created by individual citizens pursuing their everyday activities.
377. The strongest case for strict liability arises when enterprises that create commercial hazards
injure individuals who do not create similar risks. When those injured engage in the same or similar
activity, however, strict liability is nevertheless desirable. The Koos court noted that in the case
before it plaintiff was a neighbor who farmed adjacent fields. The court stated as follows:
If the accidentally impoverished neighbor is told that in the long run the losses will balance
out, he may answer, like one economist, "that in the long run we are all dead." Society has
other ways to lighten the burdens of costly but unavoidable accidents on a valued industry
than to let them fall haphazardly on the industry's neighbors.
Koos, 293 Or. at 681, 652 P.2d at 1262 (quoting Pigou, John Maynard Keynes 1883-1946, 32 PROC.
BRIT. ACAD. 395, 407 (1946)).
378. The fairness of a strict liability rule in such circumstances has long been recognized. See
supra notes 272-82 and accompanying text. In the 1930s, for example, Professor Void described the
appropriateness of strict liability for activities that exhibit a "one-sidedness" of risk creation. See
Void, West & Wolf, supra note 274, at 380-82. In the absence of such "mutuality of risk," strict
liability becomes appealing. Id. Professor Malone, in discussing Professor Vold's criterion, sug-
gested that a lack of "reciprocity of risk" could lead to strict liability. Malone, supra note 277, at
156. These formulations share with the commercial hazard criterion the characteristic of suggesting
the appropriateness of strict liability for business enterprises that create risks unlike those routinely
created by individual members of the community.
More recently, Professor George Fletcher has formulated his own version of the reciprocal risk
criterion. See Fletcher, supra note 277. He states that a plaintiff deserves to recover "for injuries
caused by a risk greater in degree and different in order from those created by the victim and im-
posed on the defendant." Id. at 542. This formulation requires a comparison of risks created by the
plaintiff and defendant and would, presumably, lead to a rejection of a strict liability claim by one
farmer against another when both engage in field burning but only one is injured. The commercial
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posing strict liability on such activities is especially apparent when one recog-
nizes that the economic benefits from the hazardous activity accrue to the
enterprise engaged in the activity.379 That enterprise is also in the best position
to maximize safety, and strict liability creates an economic incentive for it to do
just that.3 80 Furthermore, strict liability has the desirable effect of distributing
the cost of the hazardous activity among the public, rather than leaving the
burden of accident costs on innocent bystanders or neighbors.3 81 Finally, the
commercial hazard criterion ensures that strict liability does not necessarily at-
tach to everyday activities that individuals pursue, such as driving automobiles
or lighting fires in fireplaces.
3. Expansive Implications
The emergence of an alternative framework, focusing on what this Article
has called "commercial hazards," is likely to accelerate the expansion of strict
liability. As courts increasingly recognize that they can apply strict liability in
contravention of the Restatement without the specter of a boundless strict liabil-
ity doctrine, they are likely to consider favorably new applications of strict liabil-
ity, which, to date, they have been reluctant to accept. To illustrate this point,
this Article next discusses the issue of strict liability for ground damage caused
by aircraft.3 82 To further illustrate the expansive implications of the hazardous
activity case law and policy, it then considers other likely applications of the
strict liability rule.383
hazard criterion does not necessarily lead to this result. See supra note 377. Fletcher's criterion also
at times appears synonomous with the common usage criterion. See Fletcher, supra note 277, at
541-42; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 989. The commercial hazard criterion is distinct from the Re-
statement's common usage factor. See supra text accompanying notes 353-54. Nevertheless,
Fletcher's discussion of his criterion lends support to the commercial hazard criterion. He writes,
for example, that "[d]angerous activities, like blasting, fumigating, and crop dusting stand out as
distinct, nonreciprocal risks in the community. They represent threats of harm that exceed the level
of risk to which all members of the community contribute in roughly equal shares." Fletcher, supra
note 277, at 547.
379. See supra text accompanying notes 278-82.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 283-88.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 289-94.
382. The issue of aircraft ground damage is a useful focal point because it has caused so much
confusion among courts and scholars. The discussion in the Prosser and Keeton hornbook exempli-
fies this state of affairs. The authors suggest that "[i]t is reasonable to argue that physical harm
accidentally caused by airplane crashes should be a cost borne by those engaged in that kind of
undertaking since it is not as yet an activity in which people are generally engaged." PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 1, § 78, at 557. Yet they also write:
One possible suggestion as to the ultimate outcome is that strict liability might be
retained as to what may be called "abnormal" aviation including all such things as stunt
flying, crop dusting and experimental aircraft and military planes not designed primarily
for safety, and "sonic booms," while "normal" aviation, including all common commercial
flights, might require proof of negligence.
Id. at 558. And then they conclude that "[r]apid technological changes would, however, make such
a classification extremely difficult to maintain." Id.
383. See infra text accompanying notes 414-37.
[Vol. 65
HAZARDO US A CTIVITY STRICT LIABILITY
a. Ground Damage Caused by Aircraft
Despite some early strict liability decisions 384 and a special section of the
Restatement (Second) endorsing strict liability, 385 the trend of the decisions is to
reject strict liability in aircraft ground damage cases. 386 As this section of the
Article explains, however, the case for the application of strict liability is so
compelling-both in terms of policy and in terms of case precedents-that it is a
source of curiosity why courts have been hesitant to accept strict liability. One
reason for the trend against strict liability in this area undoubtedly can be found
in the Restatement. Despite the special provision in the Restatement (Second)
approving of strict liability in ground damage cases, the Restatement's general
criteria for the imposition of strict liability clearly suggest the inappropriateness
of strict liability in aircraft ground damage cases. Regarding the Restatement's
common usage requirement, a commentator has asked rhetorically, "if the re-
quirement is to be taken seriously, how could it be said that aviation... [is] not
[a matter] ... of common usage, if not in 1934, then surely today?" 387 With
respect to the additional Restatement (Second) criteria, airplanes appropriately
fly in the air and are of value to the community. Thus, to the extent to which
courts have accepted the Restatement (Second) criteria, they would hesitate
when asked to impose strict liability on aircraft for ground damage.
The Restatement criteria also discourage courts from adopting a strict lia-
bility rule for cases of ground damage by aircraft in a more subtle manner. The
criteria suggest that such a rule would necessarily entail the adoption of a strict
liability rule for automobile accidents. Thus, one commentator has stated:
The obvious source of the difficulty is that the Restatement rule makes
the probability of injury or harm from the carrying out of the activity
one of the central determinants of whether or not it is ultrahazardous.
Yet the problem with this formulation is that, at least since the end of
the Second World War, more lives have been lost per passenger mile in
automobile accidents than in airplane accidents. It is by no means easy
to construct a rationale for strict liability for ultrahazardous activities
which excludes expressly some activities which by any standard are
384. See supra text accompanying note 301.
385. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (1977). For a discussion of the debate regard-
ing this provision, see 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 146, § 14.13, at 311-12.
386. See, e.g., Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954). For a discussion of the
development of tort law in this area, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 78, at 556-58.
The Uniform Aeronautics Act, which the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated
in 1922, proposed a strict liability rule for aircraft ground damage. UNIF. AERONAUTICS ACT § 5, 9
U.L.A 17 (1932) (act withdrawn 1943). Even states adopting the Uniform Act have not necessarily
adopted the strict liability provision. "Several of the states which have adopted it have eliminated,
repealed or modified the section providing for strict liability for ground damage." PROSSER & KEE-
TON, supra note 1, § 78, at 557. Some of these statutes state that "ordinary rules of law" should
apply. Id. at n.52. However, in an era when courts apply strict liability expansively, strict liability
arguably is an "ordinary rule of law" properly applied to aircraft ground damage as well as other
hazardous activities.
387. C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, supra note 78, at 502; see also R. EPSTEIN, C
GREGORY & H. KALVEN, supra note 3, at 582-84 (later edition in which authors discuss the new
provision-RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (1977)-dealing with liability for ground
damage).
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more dangerous than others which are included.388
Unlike the Restatement, the hazardous activity doctrine that is emerging in
the case law differentiates between the automobile accident and the airplane
crash, and it points unambiguously to the desirability of applying strict liability
in the latter situation. Airplanes fall squarely within the definition of hazardous-
ness suggested by the case law. Like the fumigation involved in Luthringer v.
Moore,389 aviation "under certain conditions" (such as downdrafts or unex-
pected mechanical failure) may "be so hazardous to the public generally, and of
such relative infrequent occurrence"390 that strict liability is appropriate. Simi-
larly, aviation meets the hazardousness standard articulated by the Oregon
Supreme Court in Koos v. Roth: "If the consequences of a mishap are poten-
tially lethal or highly destructive of health or property, a slight likelihood that
they will occur suffices ... 2,391
Automobiles also involve great potential for hazardousness. Application of
strict liability to aviation, however, does not necessarily point to a regime of
strict liability rules for routine traflic accidents. The automobile fails the com-
mercial hazard test, but the airplane clearly meets it. Hazards associated with
the automobile are precisely those to which individual citizens routinely expose
themselves and others as part of their everyday activities. In contrast, the air-
craft, with its potential to crash into and destroy homes and workplaces, creates
risks of harm unlike those routinely created by individual citizens as part of their
everyday activities.
Recognition of the commercial hazard criterion thus will allow courts to
assess the merits of the application of strict liability to cases of ground damage
caused by aircraft without a misplaced apprehension that a decision in favor of
strict liability will necessarily carry over to auto accidents. When the issue of
strict liability for airplane crashes is assessed on its own merits, the case for strict
liability is compelling; the case law and policy point unambiguously to that
result.
The Washington Supreme Court's hazardous activity decisions, for exam-
ple, point directly to strict liability of airplane operators for the ground damage
they cause. If a crop duster faces strict liability for harm caused by chemicals
that poison an adjacent organic farm, as the court held in Langan v. Valicopters,
Inc.,392 it would appear anomalous not to hold the crop duster strictly liable
when his or her plane crashes into an adjacent farmhouse. Similarly, if, as was
held in Siegler v. Kuhlman,393 a commercial trucker faces strict liability for
harm caused by the explosion of fuel carried as cargo, it would appear anoma-
lous not to apply strict liability when a commercial aircraft with its thousands of
388. C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, supra note 78, at 504. But cf RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTs § 520 comment i (1977) (automobile operation not abnormally dangerous be-
cause a matter of common usage).
389. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
390. Id. at 500, 190 P.2d at 8.
391. Koos, 293 Or. at 678, 652 P.2d at 1260.
392. 88 Wash. 2d 855, 567 P.2d 218 (1977).
393. 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973).
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pounds of unburned fuel crashes into a schoolhouse, causing the fuel to explode.
Furthermore, no reason exists to distinguish the latter case from a situation in
which a massive airliner crashes into and demolishes the schoolhouse without its
fuel exploding.
Loss spreading considerations also strongly support strict liability in these
cases. Indeed, Boyd v. White,394 a leading 1954 California decision rejecting
strict liability, recognized the existence of
a strong public policy argument to the effect that the risk of damage to
third parties owning property over which airplanes are driven, at least
by student pilots, should be borne by the owners of planes, who can
and should insure themselves against such risk, and not by the inno-
cent property owner.
395
Writing from the perspective of an intermediate appellate court in the legal mi-
lieu of the 1950s, the Boyd court concluded that this loss spreading argument
"should be addressed to the Legislature and not to the courts. 396
As discussed throughout this Article, however, the loss spreading policy
has subsequently emerged as an important factor in hazardous activity cases.
Indeed, in Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co. ,397 which applied strict liability to
the test firing of a rocket motor, a California appellate court held that "public
policy calls for strict liability," concluding that "[d]efendant, who is engaged in
the enterprise for profit, is in a position best able to administer the loss so that it
will ultimately be borne by the public."' 398 Thus, the very loss spreading policy
that the Boyd court noted in the aviation context now has been applied to create
strict liability for rocket testing.
The fairness and safety considerations that have permeated the hazardous
activity case law also support the imposition of strict liability on aircraft for
ground damage. 399 The one-sidedness of the risk created by aviation makes
clear that, to promote safety, strict liability should be imposed.40° Similarly, this
one-sidedness supports the fairness of strict liability, which recognizes the rea-
sonable safety expectations of persons who have the misfortune to have an air-
craft descend on them or their homes.4° 1  The Smith court viewed the
394. 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954).
395. Id. at 655, 276 P.2d at 100.
396. Id.
397. 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967).
398. Id. at 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
399. See Vold, West & Wolf, supra note 274, at 374.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 283-88.
401. See supra text accompanying notes 273-82; see also R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H.
KALVEN, supra note 3, at 543-44 (strict liability supported on fairness grounds under causation
analysis); Fletcher, supra note 277, at 543-40 (supporting strict liability rule for airplane crashes on
fairness grounds).
The fairness of a strict liability rule is underlined by the fact that airplanes may be designed so
that if an engine fails, it will drop off the aircraft "to avoid damage to the plane." Cushman, Jet
Lands Safely After an Engine Rips from Plane Over New Mexico, Los Angeles Times, April 17, 1985,
§ 1, at 2, col. 5. Even if such a design is reasonable in light of the avoidance of damage to the
airplane and injury to the passengers, persons on the ground injured by the falling engine should be
compensated.
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landowners, whose property was damaged by adjacent rocket testing, in this
manner. The court wrote that "[t]here is no basis, either in reason or justice, for
requiring the innocent neighboring landowner to bear the loss." 4° 2 This same
principle, of course, would apply to persons on the ground who suffer harm from
airplane crashes.
The Washington Supreme Court in Siegler expressed a similar concern with
the magnitude and one-sidedness of the risk created by those who haul gasoline
as freight. The court emphasized the nature of the activity that caused injury:
"carrying of gasoline as freight in quantities of thousands of gallons at freeway
speeds."' 4 3 This characterization clearly suggests that aircraft present an even
more compelling case for strict liability. Indeed, the Restatement (Second) em-
phasizes "the gravity of the harm resulting when a few tons of flaming gasoline
descend upon a dwelling" as a result of a plane crash.4° 4 And it notes that
"those on the ground have no place to hide from falling aircraft and are helpless
to select any locality.., in which they will not be exposed to the risk .... 405
The desirability of applying hazardous activity strict liability to aviation
ground damage cases can further be appreciated if one approaches the issue
from a different perspective-that of products liability law and policy. When a
commercial airliner crashes because of a defective instrument, injured plaintiffs
have a strict products liability action against the manufacturer of the airplane,
assuming the plane was defective when manufactured. 4°6 An action under strict
products liability would not be available against the airline, however, because
the airline is neither the manufacturer nor an entity, such as a retailer, that is in
the chain of marketing and distribution of the airplane.4°7 This result appears
anomalous. Under products liability doctrine, injured plaintiffs have a strict lia-
402. Smith, 247 Cal. App. 2d at 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
403. Siegler, 81 Wash. 2d at 459, 502 P.2d at 1187.
404. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A comment c (1977).
405. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently has endorsed the application of strict liability
to the owner of an aircraft that caused ground damage even when the plane was used without the
owner's permission. Torchia v. Fisher, 95 N.J. 43, 468 A.2d 1061 (1983). The source of this strict
liability rule, however, was a statute and not the common law. The court construed the statute to
apply in stolen aircraft cases, id. at 47-48, 468 A.2d at 1062-63, and then upheld its constitutionality.
Id. at 48-49, 468 A.2d at 1063-64.
In a previous decision the court had upheld the statute as it applied to cases in which an air-
plane was flown with the owner's permission. Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, Inc., 32
N.J. 55, 159 A.2d 97 (1960). The Adler court found that one of the statute's goals was to shift the
risk associated with ground damage from the victim to the plane owner who is a better risk bearer.
Id. at 69-70, 159 A.2d at 104. In Torchia the court concluded that "[t]he same reasoning applies to
the owner of a stolen airplane, who will in many cases be the better risk bearer than the injured
victim." Torchia, 95 N.J. at 49, 468 A.2d at 1063. The court emphasized that the "owner derives
profit or pleasure from ownership of the airplane .... As between an unsuspecting homeowner or
person on the ground and the plane's owner, the Legislature could rationally decide to place the loss
on the owner, for whom the plane served some purpose." Id. at 49, 468 A.2d at 1064. The policy
considerations to which the court alluded in upholding the New Jersey statute are precisely those
policy considerations that would support a common-law rule of strict liability in the absence of a
statute.
406. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963) (implied warranty theory of recovery). Goldberg is discussed infra
text accompanying notes 409-13.
407. See Goldberg, 12 N.Y.2d at 440, 191 N.E.2d at 84-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 597-98 (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
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bility action against retailers as well as manufacturers. This extension of liability
beyond manufacturers has been justified on the ground that it serves the loss
spreading policy and on the ground that safety is promoted because the retailer
can take safety precautions or exert pressure for safety on the manufacturer.
4°8
An airline has a loss spreading capacity similar to or greater than that of the
typical product retailer and is in an even better position to take safety precau-
tions or to exert pressure on airplane manufacturers.
In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,4 ° 9 an important early strict
products liability decision, the dissenting judges argued that imposing strict lia-
bility on the airline is preferable to imposing strict liability on the airplane man-
ufacturer. In their view the purpose of strict liability is to
remove the economic consequences of accidents from the victim who is
unprepared to bear them and place the risk on the enterprise in the
course of whose business they arise. The risk, it is said, becomes part
of the cost of doing business and can be effectively distributed among
the public through insurance or by a direct reflection in the price of the
goods or service.'
1 °
Regarding airline crashes, these dissenting judges concluded that "the enterprise
to which accidents such as the present are incident is the carriage of passengers
by air-[the airline]."' ' I They emphasized that the airline "is not merely a con-
duit for the distribution of the manufacturer's consumer goods but assumes the
responsibility of selecting and using those goods itself as a capital asset in the
conduct of a service enterprise such as common carriage. '4 12 Thus, the dissent-
ing judges concluded that
any claim in respect of an airplane accident that is grounded in strict
enterprise liability should be fixed on the airline or none at all. Only in
this way do we meet and resolve, one way or another, the anomaly
presented by the reasoning of the majority, which, through reliance on
warranty incident to sales, grants a recovery to a passenger injured
through a nonnegligent failure of equipment but denies it to one in-
jured through a nonnegligent failure of maintenance or operation.
4 13
When a product defect causes an airplane crash and resulting ground dam-
age, policy considerations suggest that strict products liability should apply to
the airline. The reason that it does not is undoubtedly doctrinal: strict products
liability would then extend into services. Because of the uncharted implications
of such an extension, courts have declined to apply strict products liability to
airlines despite the clear applicability of strict products liability policies. How-
ever, these policies also support the application of hazardous activity strict liabil-
408. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-263, 391 P.2d 168, 171-172, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964).
409. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963) (Burke, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Van Voorhis, J., and Scileppi, J.).
410. Id. at 440, 191 N.E.2d at 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 441, 191 N.E.2d at 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
413. Id. at 441-42, 191 N.E.2d at 86, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
1987]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ity to aviation, and courts can take this step without creating doctrinal confusion
in strict products liability doctrine.
b. Other Applications
The previous section of this Article focused on the issue of strict liability for
ground damage caused by aircraft because that issue has confused courts and
commentators for years. The case for strict liability is compelling. That analysis
suggests, however, that strict liability also would apply to injuries caused by
other forms of commercial transportation, such as railroads and tanker trucks.
These activities meet the criterion of hazardousness. 414 They also create
hazards unlike those created by individual members of the public pursuing their
everyday activities. 415 And these activities can and should bear the accident
costs they create and spread these costs among the users of their services. 416
Fairness considerations suggest the appropriateness of strict liability when a
train derails or an out-of-control tanker truck plummets over an embankment,
injuring innocent bystanders.417 The safety incentives of strict liability also
should attach to such risk-creating activities.418
It also seems clear that new applications of strict liability are unlikely to be
exhausted by the transportation cases. Loss spreading, fairness, and safety in-
centive considerations point to the application of strict liability to other types of
activities that are hazardous and meet the commercial hazard criterion but
which, in the past, have been insulated from strict liability. Consider, for exam-
ple, the liability of water companies when an underground main bursts and
causes flooding that injures innocent bystanders. The great weight of authority
today rejects strict liability in cases of such damage. 419 As early as 1924, how-
ever, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Du-
luth420 applied strict liability when the principal main leading from a reservoir
broke. In 1964 the Iowa Supreme Court in Lubin v. City of Iowa City421 fol-
lowed Bridgeman-Russell and extended its strict liability holding beyond the
principal main leading from a reservoir, stating that it could "see no logical
distinction between mains leading from a reservoir and other mains. Damage
414. See supra text accompanying notes 329-48; see also supra note 352 (hazardousness of
trucking).
415. See supra text accompanying notes 352-76.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 289-94.
417. See supra text accompanying notes 274-82.
418. See supra text accompanying notes 283-88.
419. See, e.g., Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 59, 491 P.2d 1037 (1971)
(underground water mains do not constitute an abnormal condition warranting strict liability); see
also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 78, at 550 (underground water mains do not constitute an
abnormal condition warranting strict liability); Comment, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in
America: Abnormally Dangerous, Ultrahazardous, or Absolute Nuisance?, 1978 ARIz. ST. L.J. 99,
129 (American courts generally have not imposed strict liability for the escape of water.).
420. 158 Minn. 509, 197 N.W. 971 (1924). Bridgeman-Russell is also discussed supra text ac-
companying notes 51-57.
421. 257 Iowa 383, 131 N.W.2d 765 (1964).
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may utterly ruin an individual financially in either case."'422 And in 1969 a New
York trial court in Bierman v. City of New York 423 applied strict liability when a
water main ruptured in front of plaintiff's house. 424 Although most courts-
including the New York appellate court42 5 that rejected the Bierman strict lia-
bility holding42 6-still hesitate to extend strict liability to bursting water main
cases, this apparent hesitancy should abate once courts correctly perceive the
commercial hazard criterion that is emerging in the case law.
427
In the past courts may have been concerned that a rule of strict liability for
water pipelines would apply not only to water companies and their mains but
also to homeowners and water pipes in their houses that burst causing injury to
guests or neighbors. 428 Indeed, Dean Prosser lumped these two categories
("household pipes... [and] authorized utility mains")42 9 together in concluding
that strict liability should not apply in such situations. Yet the case law suggests
that strict liability would not apply against the homeowner when household
pipes burst. The homeowner is an individual pursuing common everyday activi-
ties; he or she does not create what this Article terms a commercial hazard.
4 30
In contrast, the water company through its potentially dangerous mains of vari-
ous sizes transports tons of water thus creating hazards unlike those that indi-
vidual citizens routinely create as part of their everyday activities.
Once courts recognize that a rule applying strict liability to the water com-
pany would not necessarily apply to the homeowner, the case for the strict liabil-
ity rule appears compelling. In Bridgeman-Russell the Minnesota Supreme
Court described the potential hazardousness of water distribution systems in
modern society:
Congestion of population in large cities is on the increase. This calls
for water systems on a vast scale either by the cities themselves or by
strong corporations. Water in immense quantities must be accumu-
lated and held where none of it existed before. If a break occurs in the
reservoir itself, or in the principal mains, the flood may utterly ruin an
422. Id. at 392, 131 N.W.2d at 771. Minnesota subsequently refused to extend strict liability to
breaks in service lines. Quigley v. Village of Hibbing, 268 Minn. 541, 129 N.W.2d 765 (1964).
423. 60 Misc. 2d 497, 302 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969), modified, 66 Misc. 2d 237, 320
N.Y.S.2d 331 (N.Y. App. Term 1970).
424. Id. at 498-99, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 697-698.
425. Bierman, 66 Misc. 2d 237, 320 N.Y.S.2d 331.
426. Id. at 238, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
427. In 1971 the Washington Supreme Court refused to apply strict liability to the rupture of an
underground water main. Pacific N.W. Bell. Tel. Co. v. Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 59, 491 P.2d
1037 (1971). The court was strongly influenced by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See id. at 63-
64, 491 P.2d at 1039-40. As this Article has discussed, however, subsequent Washington decisions
have shown a willingness to depart from the Restatement (Second), see supra text accompanying
notes 131-60, and in fact suggest the analysis put forth in this Article. See supra text accompanying
notes 359-67. Moreover, two justices dissented in the Pacific N. W. Bell decision. Pacific N. W. Bell,
80 Wash. 2d at 68-69, 491 P.2d at 1042-43 (Finley, J., dissenting, joined by Rosellini, J.).
428. See, eg., Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 59, 64-65, 491 P.2d
1037, 1040 (1971) (quoting Dean Prosser's statement that both "household pipes" and "authorized
utility mains" constituted a "natural" use of land).
429. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 78, at 550.
430. See supra notes 352-76 and accompanying text.
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individual financially.431
Safety incentive, fairness, and loss spreading considerations support strict liabil-
ity in this context. The safety incentive effects of strict liability appropriately are
directed at water companies because they-as opposed to innocent bystanders-
are in the best position to gauge what safety precautions can be taken. Similarly,
the Bridgeman-Russell court emphasized that "even though negligence be ab-
sent, natural justice would seem to demand that the enterprise, or what really is
the same thing, the whole community benefited by the enterprise, should stand
the loss rather than the individual. '432
These considerations also prompted the Iowa Supreme Court's strict liabil-
ity holding. In Lubin the court thought it neither "just nor reasonable" to "de-
liberately and intentionally plan to leave a water main underground beyond
inspection and maintenance until a break occurs and escape liability." 433 From
a policy perspective,
[t]he risks from such a method of operation should be borne by the
water supplier who is in a position to spread the cost among the con-
sumers who are in fact the true beneficiaries of this practice and of the
resulting savings in inspection and maintenance costs. When the ex-
pected and inevitable occurs, they should bear the loss and not the
unfortunate individual whose property is damaged without fault of his
own.4
34
The application of strict liability to commercial transportation and water
pipelines undoubtedly will suggest even further applications of strict liability.
The escape of natural gas from pipelines serves as an obvious example, and it
appears increasingly likely that courts will reconsider the uniform rule rejecting
strict liability.435 The creation, transportation, and storage of toxic wastes
431. Bridgeman-Russell, 158 Minn. at 511, 197 N.W. at 972.
432. Id.
433. Lubin, 257 Iowa at 390, 131 N.W.2d at 770.
434. Id. More recently, the Iowa Supreme Court reiterated its view that the loss spreading pol-
icy supports the development of hazardous activity strict liability rules. National Steel Serv. Center
v. Gibbons, 319 N.W.2d 269, 272-73 (Iowa 1982); see also supra note 239 (discussing Gibbons).
435. A typical situation in which such a strict liability rule would apply arose in New Meadows
Holding Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 34 Wash. App. 25, 659 P.2d 1113 (1983) (rejecting
strict liability), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 102 Wash. 2d 495, 687 P.2d 212 (1984) (en bane)
(rejecting strict liability). In that case plaintiff attempted to light an oil stove in his home. Unknow-
ingly, he ignited natural gas that had leaked into his home underground from a damaged gas line
several blocks away. Plaintiff sustained serious bums, and the home was destroyed by fire. New
Meadows, 34 Wash. App. at 27, 659 P.2d at 1115.
The conclusion that courts are likely to apply strict liability to the escape of natural gas from
pipelines may seem surprising in light of the fact that the uniform rule rejects strict liability, see
Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 861 (Minn. 1984), and that two state supreme
courts recently have rejected strict liability. See id. at 862; New Meadows, 102 Wash. 2d at 503, 687
P.2d at 217. Nevertheless, an examination of these recent cases suggests that courts may be willing
to reconsider strict liability in this context. In the Washington intermediate appellate court decision
Judge Munson, writing for the court, flatly rejected strict liability. New Meadows, 34 Wash. App. at
33-34, 659 P.2d at 1118. Judge Green concurred on the limited ground that "the majority opinion
•.. accurately applies current decisional law." Id. at 35, 659 P.2d at 1119 (Green, J., concurring).
Judge McInturff dissented and urged the adoption of a strict liability based on policy reasons similar
to those articulated in this Article. Id. at 42-43, 659 P.2d at 1122-23 (McInturff, J., dissenting).
The Washington Supreme Court also rejected the strict liability rule. New Meadows, 102 Wash.
2d at 501-03, 687 P.2d at 216-17. In that court, however, three of nine justices dissented and urged
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presents another inviting area for the application of strict liability. Indeed, the
New Jersey Supreme Court recently held a landowner strictly liable for harm
caused by toxic wastes that he had stored on his property and that flowed onto
the property of others.436 Such new applications of strict liability will, no doubt,
require courts to grapple with new doctrinal questions.4 37 With the hesitancy
the adoption of a strict liability rule. _1d. at 504-06, 687 P.2d at 217-18 (Rosellini, J., dissenting,
joined by Williams, C.J., and Dore, J.). These justices analogized the transmission of natural gas to
the transportation of gasoline by tanker truck and urged that Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448,
502 P.2d 1181 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973), supported application of strict liability. New
Meadows, 102 Wash. 2d at 505, 687 P.2d at 218 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). The dissenters relied on
the policy reasons discussed in this Article:
First, principles of risk allocation support the premise that between two innocent par-
ties, the one benefiting from an activity should bear the risk of loss. Having received a
benefit, that party is then in a position to spread the risk of loss to consumers of the prod-
ucts.
Furthermore, where the abnormally dangerous activity involves high risk of explo-
sions, the one engaged in that activity has a better opportunity to determine the cause of
the incident and can therefore seek indemnification. The injured plaintiff can prove negli-
gence as to a third party only with great difficulty.
Finally, the imposition of strict liability here will spur the natural gas companies to
greater safety precautions, such as periodic inspections and supervision of excavating activ-
ities within the vicinity of their lines.
Id. at 505-06, 687 P.2d at 218 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court also rejected the application of strict liability to the
escape of natural gas from gas company pipelines. Mahowald, 344 N.W.2d at 862. The court, how-
ever, moved toward a strict liability rule by holding that plaintiff could use the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur despite the contention that the gas company had not exercised exclusive control over the
pipeline. Id. at 862, 864; see supra note 295 (discussing expansive use of res ipsa loquitur as an
intermediate step toward strict liability). As in the Washington case, three justices dissented and
urged the application of strict liability. Mahowald, 344 N.W. 2d at 864, 869 (Todd, J., dissenting).
The dissenters quoted extensively from the Washington Court of Appeals dissent, discussed supra.
They concluded that "[c]onsidering the nature of franchise held by the gas company and its ability to
distribute its losses, if any, among a broad group of ratepayers, [a strict liability rule] ... is not only
equitable, but is demanded by modern concepts of liability without fault." Id. at 864.
Analogies to other applications of strict liability also support its application to leaks from natu-
ral pipelines. See, eg., City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo.
1981) (storage of large amounts of gasoline in residential area); Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220,
257 A.2d 138 (1969) (gasoline station's storage tank); McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255
Or. 324, 467 P.2d 635 (1970) (storage of large amounts of natural gas in populated area).
The application of strict liability to the escape of natural gas from pipelines would, in turn,
suggest a strict liability rule when, for example, a mechanical failure in an electric utility transformer
sends 7000 volts of electricity into a home. Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68,
212 Cal Rptr. 283 (1985) (strict liability on products theory but not on hazardous activity theory);
see also Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190 (1976) (arguments
for strict liability, including loss spreading, convincing; however, decision left to legislature); Wirth
v. Mayrath Indus., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 789 (N.D. 1979) (recognizing validity of arguments in favor of
strict liability, but leaving the decision to the legislature); see generally supra note 171 (cases discuss-
ing strict liability of handgun manufacturers).
436. State Dept. of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 463 A.2d 893 (1983); see
supra note 298.
437. For example, one cbvious issue is whether courts, once they apply strict liability in aircraft
ground damage cases, will allow injured passengers to invoke strict liability rules. The substantive
argument that passengers have somehow "assumed the risk" of such accidents is unpersuasive. See 3
F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 146, § 14.13, at 290 n.8. And the policies that support
strict liability would apply in this context. See Ursin, supra note 3, at 846 n. 114. The issue is
complicated in the case of international flights because the United States adheres to the Warsaw
Convention of 1929, which regulates liability to injured passengers. See 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES &
0. GRAY, supra note 146, § 14.13, at 298-307.
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and confusion generated by the Restatement behind them, however, courts
should be able to resolve these issues in an orderly fashion.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has described the process through which a revitalized doctrine
of hazardous activity strict liability has appeared in the case law. For decades
the doctrine was limited in scope due to the restrictive influence of the Restate-
ment of Torts.4 38 In recent years, however, the policies that originally led to the
strict products liability revolution have surfaced in hazardous activity cases.
439
As a consequence, courts today are covertly and overtly rejecting the Restate-
ment as a guide in hazardous activity cases. Instead, courts are applying strict
liability in a manner inconsistent with Restatement restrictions. 440 The expan-
sive implications of this case law have not yet fully materialized.
As courts begin to perceive the criteria that are emerging in the case law,
44 1
they are likely to endorse new applications of strict liability. This Article dis-
cussed the example of aircraft ground damage to illustrate this point.442 It is
remarkable that, in an era of expanded strict liability, the apparent trend is to
reject strict liability in this situation. The case for strict liability is compelling,
despite the fact that airplanes are common, appropriately flown in the air, and of
value to the community. 443 Elementary fairness and safety concerns suggest
that an airline whose plane crashes into a home should compensate innocent
victims and spread the loss among its shareholders and patrons.
Moreover, existing case law supplies a doctrinal framework that supports
this application of strict liability. Aircraft create risks unlike those routinely
created by individual members of the community pursuing their everyday activi-
ties. Thus, under the commercial hazard criterion, which this Article has identi-
fied in the case law,444 strict liability would apply when an aircraft causes
ground damage. Under this criterion, courts could distinguish the routine auto-
mobile accident from the airplane crash-as well as from the overturning tanker
truck or train derailment. Similarly, courts could apply strict liability to burst-
ing water mains, natural gas pipelines, and agricultural field burning, while dis-
tinguishing bursting household water and gas pipes, and fireplace fires.
438. See supra notes 65-129 and accompanying text.
439. See supra notes 240-96 and accompanying text.
440. See supra notes 130-239 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 297-381 and accompanying text.
442. See supra notes 384-413 and accompanying text.
443. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(d)-(f) (1977).
444. See supra notes 349-81 and accompanying text.
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